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This dissertation consists of three essays about firm financing. The first essay detects
the bank-firm relationship in a transition country while the second and third essays
address the importance of country factors in a company’s capital structure decisions.
There is an extensive literature on financial crises and their effects on the economy.
However, quantitative analyses at the firm level are rare. Therefore, an important
issue to study is the effect of financial sector difficulties on the firm’s ”real” decisions:
investment, profitability, etc. The issue is particularly under-explored in the context
of transition economies, where the financial systems are fragile and the occurrence of
financial crises is common. My first essay fills that gap in the literature: I study the
effect of an Estonian bank’s failure in 1998 on its corporate loan clients by comparing
the performance of clients to that of a random sample of other firms. First, I analyze
whether bank bankruptcy causes the bankruptcy of client firms. I find that client firms
are less likely to survive until 2000 even after controlling for their pre-bank bankruptcy
performance. Hence, the bank-firm relationship has a significant value in a transition
country. Second, I analyze the behavior of firms’ profitability, liquidity, and growth of
fixed assets by differences in differences analyses. I find liquidity to be the only variable
that decreases for client firms compared to control firms after bank bankruptcy. This
suggests that liquidity is the channel through which the bank failure transfers to the
failure of the clients.
The optimal capital structure of a firm has found lot of attention in the corpo-
rate finance literature. Many different factors are proposed as potential determinants
of firm leverage. It appears that firm capital structure emerges from three sources:
firm-specific, country-institutional and macroeconomic factors. In my second essay I
evaluate the importance of each source in explaining the firm leverage variation si-
multaneously. I use a large European dataset covering almost 600,000 firms from 10
Western European countries over 1995-2002. The data are well balanced across firm
sizes and industries. The unique feature of this dataset is that it allows me to study
the capital structure of small firms, which has not been studied to date due to lack of
data. I show that the country institutions and macroeconomic factors are significant
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determinants of firm leverage and that their significance varies across firm types. These
factors are primary determinants of small and unlisted company leverage. This finding
supports the belief that small firms are financially constrained and are less independent
in determining their own leverage. Therefore, the conclusions of previous studies based
on large stock market-listed firms are not portable to the average firm and additional
research in the field is needed.
The third essay is interested in capital structure determinants in the transition
countries. Market-based financial institutions emerged just recently in these economies,
indicating that imperfections in financial markets, which explain the leverage level of
firms, might be especially large. This study is based on a large sample of listed and
unlisted companies from nine Eastern European countries. I find that country-specific
factors explain the largest share of leverage variation for small unlisted firms while firm-
specific factors explain the most for listed and large unlisted companies. This finding is
well in line with the results based on Western European firms. Hence, it seems that the
development level of the local financial market does not make country-specific factors
more prominent.
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Does bank failure affect client firms?
Micro evidence from Estonia
Karin Jõeveer∗
Abstract
I explore the effect of a bank’s failure on its client firms using the 1998
bankruptcy of a middle-sized Estonian bank. I compare the performance of
firms receiving credit from the failed bank to that of a randomly selected set of
firms between 1996 and 2000. I find the client firms to be more likely to go out
of business after their bank’s failure even after controlling for firm performance
before the event. I also observe a decrease in client firms’ liquid assets just after
the bank failure, suggesting that the loss of liquidity may be the channel through
which bank failure transfers to the failure of clients.
Keywords: bank failure, client firm performance, firm survival.
JEL classification: G14, G21, G3
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1 Introduction
The bank-firm relationship, like any other lender-borrower relationship, involves asym-
metry of information. This imperfection of the market allows firms to reap a cost
advantage from long-term relationships with banks (Diamond 1991). Hence, it is natu-
ral to expect that the failure of a bank should affect its client firms’ future performance
due to the breakdown of the favored-credit channel.
Several studies, based on bank crashes in the U.S., Japan, and Korea (Slovin,
Sushka, and Polonchek 1993, Gibson 1995, Kang and Stulz 2000, Yamori and Murakami
1999, Miyajima and Yafeh 2007, Bae, Kang, and Lim 2002) confirm this prediction and
imply that the bank-firm relationship has economic value. Furthermore, this effect
apparently differs across countries according to the availability of equity financing. In
particular, Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2003) do not find any effects of the banking
crisis in Norway in 1988-91 on firms’ equity value. The authors explain this departure
from the results typical for Japan or Korea by the fact that Norwegian firms were using
relatively more public equity financing.
To date, there has been no empirical evaluation of the effect of bank failure on client
firm performance in the context of a transition economy. This is surprising because
the specific nature of transition economies makes this issue particularly important.
First, bank failures are common in transition economies (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996,
2002).1 Second, the majority of firms in transition countries are relatively young and
lack reputation. Diamond (1991) suggests that such firms are more likely to depend
on borrowing from banks as opposed to direct borrowing (issuing bonds or commercial
papers). The stock markets are young as well and their level of activity is low (Grosfeld
and Roland 1997). Bank borrowing is therefore the main external financing channel
in transition economies (Cornelli, Portes, and Schaffer 1998).2 Further, empirical ev-
idence from Korea (Bae, Kang, and Lim 2002) implies that the failure of a bank has
1For example all ten new European Union Central and Eastern European member states suffered
a systematic banking crisis sometime in the 1990’s (Caprio and Klingebiel 2002).
2Calvo and Coricelli (1997) suggest that at least 20% of the output collapse in early transition was
explained by contraction in credit.
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comparatively more severe effects on those firms that rely mainly on banks for their
financing.
In this paper, I fill the gap in the literature by evaluating the bank-client relationship
in a transition economy. I choose Estonia, as it is an important case to study for several
reasons. First, it has had a currency board system since 1992. Hence, monetary policy
has not been used to respond to the shocks in the financial market. Second, Estonia
is also one of the most economically free countries in the world.3 A liberal policy has
exposed Estonian firms to international shocks and allows for an analysis of market
forces not affected by numerous distorting government policies. Third, Estonia had
a banking crisis at the beginning of its transition period (1992-1995)4 and suffered
another banking crisis in 1998. This study considers the later crisis. The 1998 crisis
was triggered by exogenous shocks to the financial system from the Asian and later
from the Russian crisis. Given that the primary cause of the crisis was not related to
a bad loan portfolio, it offers a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of bank
failure on firm performance.
Estonia had twelve banks at the beginning of 1998 but only six at the end of the
year. Eesti Maapank (the Land Bank of Estonia) was the first to disappear.5 It lost
its license in June 1998 because of permanent insolvency.6 At the beginning of 1998,
the bank was ranked the seventh-largest based on total assets and covered 4% of the
market. The first part of my sample consists of 119 firms that were clients of the Land
Bank of Estonia.
The client firms of the failed bank were not listed on the Estonian Stock Exchange.
Hence, in contrast to earlier studies on the effect of bank failure on client firms, I am
3The Heritage Index of Economic Freedom 2003 (http://cf.heritage.org/index/indexoffreedom.cfm)
placed Estonia in the sixth position among 156 countries.
4For more details see Hansson and Tombak (1999) and Fleming, Chu, and Bakker (1996).
5Later, in the summer of 1998 two middle-sized banks merged with the two biggest banks in Estonia
and in the fall, after the negative shock from Russia, two small banks went bankrupt and two other
small banks merged with each other.
6The shareholders tried to recapitalize the bank in April 1998 but failed. The main reasons for
insolvency were the mismanagement of the loan and securities portfolio. The potential bad loan
portfolio of the bank should be considered with caution because the direction of causality between
bank failure and firm failure is not clear. I address this issue in the analysis by controlling for firm
financial characteristics before the bank crash.
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not able to quantify the effect on firms’ equity values. This also means that the firms
in my sample do not rely on public equity financing; bank loans are the main external
source of finance.7 To measure performance I rely on information in the firms’ balance
sheets and income statements. To analyse the potential effect of bank failure on firm
performance I use a comparison group of 114 randomly selected Estonian firms. Even
though I do not have any information about the bank-specific lending relationship for
my comparison group firms, I assume that the probability that they were clients of
some other bankrupt bank is small.8 The data cover the years 1996-2000.
The analysis is split into two parts. The first part examines the survival of the firm
to detect whether the bank failure is followed by client firm failure. The second part
of the analysis studies the effect of the bank failure on firm performance measures. I
find that client firms of the failed bank are more likely to exit the sample and I find
that one out of three performance measures studied was affected by the bank failure.
Particularly, I find a negative effect on client firm liquidity.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review theoretical and
empirical studies of the bank-firm relationship. In this section I also spell out my
testable hypothesis. The data and methodology section follows. Section 4 presents the
results, and I conclude in section 5.
2 The Bank-Firm Relationship
The theoretical foundations of the benefits of the bank-firm relationship are pointed
out by Diamond (1984). Diamond stresses that financial intermediaries with a diver-
sified asset portfolio are in a better position to monitor borrowers and therefore are
better off in overcoming the issue of asymmetric information.9 Diamond (1991) finds
734% of firm financing came from internal resources in 1998 in Estonia. Domestic bank loans
constituted 29% of total external financing of Estonian firms. Together with loans from the foreign
sector the share of resources from banking is 51% (Kangur, Rajasalu, and Randveer 1999) compared
to 66% in Japan and 39% in the U.S. (Gibson 1995).
8The two other bankrupt banks covered together approximately 4% of the market (see also footnote
5).
9The bank-firm relationship may also have a negative effect on banks, see Giannetti (2003).
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that firms that have long credit records — older firms with long relationships with a
bank — face cheaper borrowing. On the other hand, firms with good reputations are
likely to rely on financial markets directly by issuing bonds and equity for satisfying
their external finance needs, so their financing decisions are less dependent on bank
credit. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) consider in more detail the firm’s choice between
borrowing from a financial intermediary or directly from the market. They show that
only large firms can borrow directly from the market. Intermediate-size firms borrow
from banks and the smallest firms do not have any access to outside financing. The
explicit inference of this is that large firms are more flexible in their borrowing decisions
and they should find it easier to switch from one financier to another.
There is now an extensive empirical literature evaluating the bank-firm relationship.
Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) explore the effect of the near failure of the
Continental Illinois Bank in 1984. They identify the effect of bad news in the banking
sector on client firms’ equity value by combining the loan clients of Continental Illinois
Bank into a single portfolio and comparing the return of this portfolio to the market
portfolio. They find that firms that have a borrowing relationship with the distressed
bank have significant negative excess returns in the period of bank difficulties, in this
particular case in the two and a half months before the rescue. The bank rescue
announcement turned the excess returns positive, but they remained lower compared
to the negative returns made at the time of bank distress.
Yamori and Murakami (1999) carry out a similar study for the Japanese Hokkaido
Takusyoku Bank in 1997. In addition, they were able to answer the question of whether
the closeness of the relation with the failed bank had an effect on the firm, since in
Japan firms report annually the banks they use, in order of significance. Yamori and
Murakami identify large negative abnormal returns to firms having a tighter relation-
ship with the failed bank on the day of the bank failure and the day after. More
generally Miyajima and Yafeh (2007) investigate the influence of many different events
related to the Japanese financial sector in the 1990’s to company stock prices. They
find that small firms in low-tech sectors with high leverage, a low credit rating and often
with a low market-to-book ratio are affected the most. The whole banking sector crash
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in Norway in 1988-91 and its influence on firms is considered by Ongena, Smith, and
Michalsen (2003). Surprisingly, they find that firms’ equity values slightly increased
at the time of the crisis. Although banks were the major source of external financing
in Norway, the banking distress did not damage the investment abilities of the firms.
One of the explanations of the contrasting results compared to previous studies is that
Norwegian firms were issuing on average new equity more often.10
Another branch of the empirical literature detects what type of firms are more
affected by banking crises and whether we can identify a real effect (i.e., a decrease in
investment). Gibson (1995) finds that a firm’s investment depends on its main bank’s
credit rating. The client of a lower-rated bank invested less during the banking sector
weakness (1991-92) in Japan. Besides looking at bank characteristics, Kang and Stulz
(2000) show that a firm’s performance during the banking crisis depends also on firm
characteristics, such as its financing structure. The firm that uses mainly bank loans
for financing investments invested less during the contraction of the Japanese banking
industry at the beginning of the 1990’s. Also the stock performance of a more bank-
dependent firm is worse at the time of a banking crisis. Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002)
find support for the previous hypothesis in the case of Korea in 1997-98. In addition
they find that a financially weaker firm (e.g. less profitable) is more affected by the
health of the banking sector.
The studies mentioned in the previous paragraph are more directly connected to
my research agenda in that they do not concentrate narrowly on changes in stock
prices, but rather deal with longer-term effects. In my study I consider the effect of
bank failure on firm bankruptcy probability, as well as on profitability, liquidity, and
investment. Based on existing theory and empirical studies I formulate the following
hypotheses: the failure of the bank increases the bankruptcy probability of the client
firms, and it decreases client firms’ profitability, liquidity, and investments. In Table
1, I summarize the testable predictions and the definitions of the financial ratios I use.
I define profitability as net profit (loss) from normal operations to total assets. By
1033% of Norwegian firms issued equity in each year compared to 10% of Japanese firms (Ongena,
Smith, and Michalsen 2003).
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liquidity I mean the share of liquid assets (current assets) to total assets. Investment
is defined as the growth rate of fixed assets, where fixed assets are expressed in 1997
prices.
3 Data and Methodology
The present analysis is focused on a bank failure that occurred in June 1998 in Estonia.
The analysis is based on an annual panel of loan clients of the bank under study and
a random sample of Estonian firms. From now on, I will refer to those firms that were
served by the bankrupt bank as the treatment group and the other firms as the control
group. I use a 1997 sample of firms and follow their performance until 2000. My data
also cover information from 1996 for some firms. The firms’ balance sheets and income
statements were obtained from the Estonian Center of Registers. This is an institution
that collects and records the data across different registers including the Enterprise
Register. All Estonian firms are legally required to report balance sheet and income
statement data for each fiscal year.
The 119 firms in my treatment group were drawn from a list of the 450 Land Bank
loan clients in June 1998. The random sampling procedure was stratified by industry.
Industrial firms were over-sampled because this sector is considered to be less correlated
with the business cycle compared to the trade and construction sectors, for example,
and therefore the change in firm performance can be more directly assigned to bank
failure. About 40% of the enterprises are from the industrial sector. The control group
consists of 114 enterprises with similar size and industrial structure as the treatment
group in 1997. The firms in my sample are privately owned with a few exceptional
municipal firms. Less than 10 firms are foreign-owned.
Table 2 gives the summary statistics for the firms in the sample in 1997, the start
of my sample frame. Average annual sales is higher for treatment firms while the
medians are at a similar level for both groups. The average profit is higher for the
treatment group while the median is higher for control firms. In section 4 I explore
more deeply the differences between the financial ratios of the two groups of firms. The
13
age structure of the firms in both groups is similar. The average age is a little more
than six years. The share of exporting firms is higher in the control group, where 53%
of firms were involved in exporting their products versus 43% in the treatment group.
A first look at the data reveals significant firm attrition. Almost 35% of treatment
and 18% of control firms were erased from the Enterprise Register by 2002.11 Hence,
it is important to explore whether this attrition is related to the bank failure or not. I
analyze firm survival with a logit model conditioning on 1997 firm performance, that
is, performance before the bank crash. In particular, I control for 1997 profitability,
leverage, size, age, and industry. Next, I also estimate a duration model of firm exit
hazard — the per-period probability of firm bankruptcy.12 This model allows me to
focus on the timing (year) of the exit, which is important for detecting the lag between
the bank failure and firm failure. I define the firm exit year as the last year when the
firm submitted its financial statements to the Enterprise Register.13
After analysing firm survival, I explore the evolution of several firms’ performance
indicators. In order to identify the specific channel through which bank failure affects
firms I look at profitability, liquidity, and the growth rate of fixed assets. First, I
present a simple before-and-after analysis — the difference in differences comparisons
of treatment and control firms’ performance. Specifically, I calculate the mean values of
performance measures for the years before and after the bank failure and I compare the
change in the treatment firms’ performance with that of control firms.14 Second, I use
yearly panel data to test for the presence of a “treatment effect” on firm performance
after conditioning for industry and firm fixed effects. Compared to the difference in
differences analysis, panel data estimation allows one to identify the year in which the
client firms’ performance deteriorates.
11Firms exit from the register either because of bankruptcy or liquidation. In both cases the firm
is out of business.
12See Shumway (2001) for an application of hazard models to firm bankruptcy.
13The official bankruptcy date therefore may differ from the one used by me (the courts work slowly)
but I consider that following the financial statements reveals the firm’s struggle well.




In this section I first estimate the probability for a firm to survive untill 2002.15 Specif-
ically, I ask whether the chances of survival are different for the failed bank clients
compared to other firms. I estimate the logit model and control for the treatment
dummy, a constant term, a set of industry indicators, and 1997 firm-specific perfor-
mance information. The binary dependent variable “Survival” in the logit model has a
value of 1 if the firm is still in my sample in 2002 and 0 if, by 2002, the firm is bankrupt
or liquidated. The results are presented in column (1) of Table 3.16
All included firm-specific variables are statistically significant. The coefficient on
the 1997 profitability variable has a positive sign and the coefficient on the 1997 leverage
ratio has a negative sign,17 suggesting that more profitable and less leveraged firms are
more likely to survive.
The logarithm of sales is included in the regression in order to control for the size
of the firm.18 The coefficient on this variable has a negative sign, suggesting that small
firms are more likely to survive. This is a somewhat puzzling result because usually
small firms are considered more likely to go bankrupt (Ohlson 1980).19
I also test for the effect of firm age. Column (1) in Table 3 includes a dummy for the
youngest firms established in 1996-97. The coefficient of this variable is significantly
negative. Firms established in 1996-97 are 19% more likely to go bankrupt than the
firms established before 1996.20 This result is consistent with theoretical predictions
15Ohlson (1980) was one of the first to use logit analysis in the context of firm bankruptcy.
16In column (2) of Table 3 are the marginal effects. All the marginal effects in the logit and later
in the hazard estimation are calculated at the means of the independent variables.
17I define leverage as total liabilities to total assets. The results are robust if the loans to total
assets ratio would be used instead.
18Results are robust to the use of the logarithm of total assets as an alternative proxy for firm size.
19The negative coefficient of the logarithm of sales variable might be accounted for by the restruc-
turing of the large Soviet-time firms (see also footnote 20 for more details).
20In an unreported specification I also test (1) whether less liquid firms are more likely to fail; (2)
whether the large firms established during Soviet times were more likely to be the ones which collapse
after the bank failure (note that in my data I do not observe the renaming and reorganization of
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(Diamond 1991) as well as empirical findings (Westgaard and van der Wijst 2001).21
The most important result is the statistically significant negative coefficient on the
treatment dummy. Treatment firms are 13% more likely to go bankrupt compared to
control firms. This result means either that treatment firms are weaker firms than
firms in the control group (but this weakness is not accounted for by the 1997 financial
characteristics) or that the bank failure has had a negative effect on the treatment
firms.22 Therefore it is important to understand the reasons for the bank bankruptcy.
After bank closure both bad loans as well as weak security portfolio management
were pointed out as reasons for bank failure. An argument against the reverse causality
story (bad loan portfolio) is provided by the Bank of Estonia’s Banks Inspection report.
In this report the Banks Inspectorate evaluated the Land Bank’s last balance sheet. On
the asset side an additional 12 million kroons (approximately 1% of total assets) were
added for the provision of credit. At the same time shares and bonds were written off
in the amount of 286.6 million kroons (23% of total assets). The Land Bank’s exposure
to the stock market was much larger compared to peer banks. At the beginning of 1997
the share of securities in total assets was 15%, while for the peer banks the average
figure was 14%. By September (one month before the stock market crash) the Land
Bank’s share of securities had risen to 33%, while for the other banks the average
figure was 19%. In absolute terms the Land Bank’s security portfolio increased 5.5
times from January to September while the loans to commercial undertakings almost
did not change. This is direct evidence that the decline in the stock market at the
end of 1997 had a much larger effect on the failed bank compared to the other banks.
firms); (3) whether firms with and without credit behave differently; (4) whether exporting firms are
more likely to go out of business after 1998; and (5) whether firms with a credit line in the failed bank
(this provides a proxy for the closeness of the bank-firm relationship) are affected more by the bank
failure. None of these hypotheses were supported by the data.
21In estimations not reported here I also confirm that treatment firm survival is not different from
control firms with respect to performance measures. I did this by adding to the logit regression
interaction terms of treatment dummy and performance measures but the observed coefficients were
insignificant.
22A possible problem of this methodological approach is that the control firms may differ from
treatment firms based on some financial characteristics. Hence, there might be the question whether
we compare similar firms to start with. To overcome this I use a propensity score matching based on
firms’ observables to detect the treatment effect on firm survival. The treatment effect is still found
and it is highly statistically significant. See section 4.2 for details.
16
Big damages in the stock market caused the bank’s loss of liquidity. The Land Bank
suffered also because of changes in the commercial bank regulations introduced by the
Bank of Estonia. In summer 1997 the risk weight on local government lending was
increased from 50% to 100% and in October the capital adequacy ratio was increased
from 8% to 10%.
To shed light on the issue of bank failure as a trigger of firm failure, it is important
to test when exactly the exit of firms occurred. If treatment firms went out of business
shortly after bank failure, this would help to support the hypothesis that the bank
bust causes client firm failure. I estimate a discrete-time logit-specification duration
model, where duration corresponds to years of firm presence in my sample. Duration
models build upon the concept of a hazard function, which is defined as the probability
of leaving a given state at a specific duration conditional upon staying there up to that
point. Such a simple duration model boils down to a logit estimation using each year
of firm presence in the data as one observation.23
In the duration analysis, each observation corresponds to a firms’ submission of
an end-of-year financial report to the Enterprise Register.24 The dependent variable
has a value of 0 if a firm exists in the next (year) period and equals 1 if a given
firm exits the sample in the next period. I control for the differences in initial financial
characteristics of firms by including the 1997 firm-specific data into my duration model.
I also include year dummies (to absorb the economy-wide effects), industry dummies,
and the interaction terms of treatment and year dummies. The last regressors are of
interest since they detect whether the exit hazard for treatment firms is higher in some
particular year after a bank crash.
The results are reported in column (3) of Table 3. The initial firm profitability is
negatively related to going bankrupt in the next period. Firms with high profit ratios
are less likely to disappear but this coefficient is estimated imprecisely. Also, more
leveraged, large and young firms are more likely to exit the sample, confirming the
23I do not consider unobservable heterogeneity in the duration model (Heckman and Singer 1984)
due to the small amount of data available.
24My sample was selected based on the firms existing in 1997. Therefore the 1996 data are condi-
tional on firms existing in 1997 and are not useful in this estimation.
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results from the logit regression for survival. The coefficients of treatment and year
dummies interaction terms are positive and significant for 1998 and 1999. This means
that treatment firms were more likely to exit than other firms in 1998 and 1999. In year
2000, 2001 and 2002 the interaction terms are insignificant, suggesting little difference
between the exit rates of treatment and control firms. Hence, the hazard estimation
confirms that treatment firms are more likely to fail just after their bank’s failure and
that the effect decreases over time.
The analysis in this section confirms that treatment firms are more likely to go out
of business compared to other firms. My analysis allows for the interpretation of this
result as the effect of the bank failure. Hence, I find a real long term negative effect
of bank failure on the economy. Compared to the firm-level studies on bank failure in
the U.S. or Japan (Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek 1993, Yamori and Murakami 1999),
which detect the announcement effect (negative returns to the failed bank client firms
assets prices) the effect I find is more severe.25 The reason for the different size of
the effect may be that Estonian firms in the study are smaller and more dependent
on bank finance. Those firms do not use public equity and the main source of outside
financing is bank credit. The result found might be magnified because of the change
of environment. The bank failure in 1998 was shortly followed by the Russian crisis,
causing the general tightening of bank credit in Estonia in 1999.26
4.2 Firm Performance
After identifying the impact of bank failure on client firms’ existence it is natural to
ask whether the effect of bank failure is manifested in firms’ performance measures. In
the following analysis I consider the evolution of three measures: profitability, liquidity
and growth rate of fixed assets as a proxy for investment (see Table 1 for the definitions
of variables).
It is natural to expect bank failure to affect firm liquidity. The client firms’ accounts
25In a recent study on U.S. county-level data, Ashcraft (2005) shows that local bank failure has a
permanent negative effect on real county income.
26Estonian total banking sector credit volume was 127, 164 and 151 billion 1997 Estonian kroons
for 1997, 1998 and 1999, respectively.
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in the failed bank were frozen. Therefore as long as the client firm kept most of its
liquid assets in the failed bank, the liquidity of the firm has to decrease. The effect
on client firms’ profitability may bite through competition from firms which do not
experience any liquidity difficulties. The growth rate of fixed assets is expected to
decrease after bank failure due to the difficulties of changing creditors. Hence, there
are fewer sources of funds available for investment.
I start out by conducting a difference in differences analysis across treatment and
control groups over time; the results are reported in Table 4. First, profitability was
significantly lower for treatment firms before 1998. This may be explained by the fact
that more profitable firms generate enough internal funds and they do not need to
borrow from the bank.27 After 1998 the means of the profitability of the two groups
becomes insignificantly different because of a significant decrease of profitability in the
control group. Second, the share of liquid assets was smaller in both time periods for
treatment firms, but more importantly the liquidity of treatment firms decreases over
time while the control firms’ liquidity does not change. This is in accord with the
prediction that bank failure adversely affects the client firms’ financial state. Third,
the means of investment were not statistically different across the two groups of firms
before and after 1998. Investments decreased significantly for both groups of firms
over time. Note that the number of firms is much lower in the first period (due to
calculating growth rates we lose one firm-year). Hence, the investments from the first
period is likely to be biased since the youngest firms’ growth rates are not represented.
Based on a comparison of the two groups we see that some treatment firms’ financial
characteristics are different from the control firms’ before bank failure but only liquidity
reveals the deterioration of client firms’ performance after the bank crash compared to
the other firms.
Still, the differences in treatment and control firm financial characteristics before
the bank failure might signal that the control firms are really not comparable to treat-
ment firms. To overcome this, I perform simple one-to-one matching28 based on 1997
27See Bartowski, Grosfeld, and Rostowski (2000) for more information about investment and finance
in de novo private firms in transition countries.
28I use the psmatch2 command in STATA. The matching was done on common support with
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profitability and liquidity to focus only on firms with similar characteristics before bank
failure. As a result 84 treatment firms are matched with 80 control firms.
Table 5 reproduces Table 4 results on the matched subsample of firms only. In
this subsample the financial characteristics of firms in the treatment and control group
before 1998 are not statistically different (this was the objective of the matching). The
significant loss of liquidity for treatment firms over time is still present in the data.
In Table 6 the results of Table 3 are reproduced on a subsample of matched firms.
The first two columns refer to the firm survival analysis with a simple logit model.
The treatment dummy has a negative and statistically significant coefficient but more
importantly the magnitude of the effect is identical to the one obtained on a complete
sample. I find that the treatment firms are now 12% more likely to exit than control
firms compared to 12.8% on the complete sample. The rest of the coefficients are
very similar to the results in Table 3 except that the estimate of the profitability has
increased from 0.294 in the complete sample estimation to 0.833 in the subsample.
Hence, one unit increase in profitability contributes more for the firm survival in the
subsample than in the complete sample of firms. The results of the Hazard function
estimation are reported in column 3-4 in Table 6 and they are similar to the results in
Table 3. The only concern is that none of the marginal effects of the interaction terms
shown between the year and treatment dummies are significant. The most significant
is the interaction of the 1998 year dummy and the treatment dummy at the 11%
significance level. Hence, the results from the subsample analysis still support the
original finding that the failure of a bank is closely followed by the failure of the client
firms only at the lower significance level.
Next, I perform panel data estimation using the same three financial ratios as in
the difference in differences analysis. The panel data estimation allows one to detect
the yearly changes in the treatment firm performance compared to control firms. I run
a fixed effect model. The estimated regression is of the following form:
Yit = α0 + αi + δTi + βDt + γTi ∗ Dt + εit,
where i=1 to 233 is the firm index and t=1 to 5 is the year index. Y is either
replacement and trimming at the 30% level.
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profitability, liquidity or investment. εit is a symmetrically distributed error term. D
is the year dummy, T is the treatment group dummy and T ∗ D is the interaction
term between the treatment and year dummies. The interaction term is calculated
for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 to capture the potentially different behavior of the
treatment group after the bank crash. The interaction terms are of interest in this
regression analysis.29 All regressions include industry dummies.
Table 7 contains the results of the fixed effect model but, for brevity, only the
interaction terms of treatment and year dummies are presented. If the failed bank’s
client firms are performing worse than other firms after 1998 then the coefficients
in front of the interaction terms should be negative and significant. I find only one
statistically significant estimate of interaction terms. The coefficient of the interaction
of 1999 and the treatment dummy in the liquidity regression has a negative significant
estimate. Hence, treatment firms’ liquid assets decreased in 1999 more than the control
firms’. This confirms the findings from the difference in differences analysis — bank
failure decreases clients’ liquid asset base just one year after bank bankruptcy.
However, note that if a firm went out of business, we do not see it anymore in the
sample and it is not taken into account in calculating the means of financial ratios. So
the difference in differences and the fixed effect analyses are biased since the comparison
samples are conditional on the firm’s existence. I face a sample selection problem —
the exit of firms may be related to unobservables in the performance equations. The
bias is likely to be larger for the profitability and liquidity variables, which are well
known bankruptcy predictors (Altman 1968).
There are several ways to overcome the sample selection issue. One may want to use
the procedure proposed by Heckman (1976), which incorporates the inverse Mill’s ratio
from a probit estimation of firm survival into the least-square estimation method of
firm performance measures. I cannot execute this procedure because I lack an exclusion
restriction. I do not observe any measure that would be connected only to firm failure
29It is found in the empirical studies of corporate finance that firm characteristics like size, sales
growth, etc. help to determine firm profitability, liquidity, and investment. However, the inclusion of
other co-variates raises the potential issue of simultaneous equation bias. In unreported regressions
I included firm characteristics in my basic specification. This did not change the estimates of the
interactions of the treatment and year dummies.
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but not to firm performance. However, the Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares
estimation method (STLS) (Chay and Powell 2001) is available for testing liquidity
and profitability — the two measures that are linked with firm exit. The observed
values of the dependent variables are truncated and therefore the dependent variables
have an asymmetric distribution. STLS restores symmetry by trimming the data from
above, which allows one to use the least-squares method of estimation. The standard
errors are bootstraped.
Table 8 presents the results of the STLS estimation.30 Again, only the coefficients
of the treatment dummy and the interaction terms between the treatment and year
dummies are reported. The treatment dummy is a significant regressor in both regres-
sions. This supports the difference in differences analysis — the negative sign in front
of the treatment dummy confirms that the treatment firms are less profitable and less
liquid. The coefficients in front of the interaction terms between the treatment and
year dummies are insignificant, except for the interaction of the year 1999 and treat-
ment dummy in liquidity estimation. The estimate of this interaction term is negative
and statistically significant at the 10% level. Therefore, the STLS estimation confirms
the fixed effects analysis, although at a lower confidence level.
The analyses in this section confirm that the bank failure has had a negative effect
on client firms’ liquidity while it has had no negative effect on clients’ profitability and
investments compared to other firms. Hence, liquidity seems to be the channel linking
the failure of the bank to the failure of client firms.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the effect of bank failure on client firm performance. The study
is based on a bank bankruptcy in Estonia in 1998. Since bank financing is a significant
source of external funds for firms in countries undergoing market reforms, the question
of the impact of bank failure is an important field of study.
The research based on bank failures in the U.S. and Japan argues that negative
30The STLS results are robust to the truncation level of the dependent variable.
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news about a bank causes a decrease in the client firms’ stock price. The length of
the effect varies from a few days to a few months. In my study the client firms are
not listed on the stock market. My analyses rely on yearly firm financial statements. I
find that client firms are 13% less likely to survive until 2002 compared to other firms.
The exit rate of client firms is higher just after bank failure compared to other firms,
supporting the idea that the bank’s closure was the reason why the firms went out of
business. I find that young, more leveraged, less profitable and large firms are more
likely to fail.
I also study the effect on the performance measures of firms. I find that the client
firms’ share of liquid assets to total assets decreases after bank failure compared to
the other firms. The loss of liquidity may be the channel through which bank failure
transfers to client firms’ failures. My results confirm that bank dependence is an
important issue in transition economies. An important policy implication of my paper’s
finding is that banking authorities should seriously bear in mind the spill-over effect of
bank failure on firms when considering whether to offer a bailout package to a failed
bank or not.
This study relates to several research areas. First, it links to the literature on the
effects of banking crises on economic conditions (Bernanke 1983). Second, by looking
at the relationship between company performance and bank insolvency, the paper also
provides microeconomic insight into the rich body of research on the link between
financial system and economic growth (see e.g. Levine and Zervos 1998, Rajan and
Zingales 1998, and Filer, Hanousek, and Campos 1999). Third, the paper also fits into
the growing corporate finance literature on the determinants of company performance
and the impact of financing constraints on the behavior of firms (Fazzari, Hubbard,
and Petersen 1988).
In light of my results further research should be encouraged on the bank failure
effects on client firms in financially less developed and more bank-dependent economies.
It also would be interesting to know whether the bank failure affects stock market-listed
and unlisted firms differently in developed countries.
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Characteristics Proxies Predicted relationship
Profitability Return on assets (pf) = profit from normal
activities / total assets
pfA < pfB
Liquidity Liquidity (liquid) = (current assets - current
liabilities) / total assets
liquidA < liquidB
Investment Growth rate in fixed assets (grfa)= change in
fixed assets / fixed assets
grfaA < grfaB
Note: Here subscript A (B) refers to the ratio after (before) the bank crash.
Table 2—Summary Statistics
Treatment group Control group






Real estate 8.40 8.77
Other 5.04 4.39
Sales 24,30 5,45 92,70 15,40 5,25 40,60
Profit from normal operations 0,27 0,02 1,92 -0,11 0,11 3,54
Age (in years) 6,28 4 11,2 6,54 4 12,9
Share of firms exporting 43.70 49.81 52.63 50.15
Share of survived firms 64.70 47.99 82.45 38.20
Number of firms 119 114
Note: Sales and profits are given in millions of 1997 Estonian kroons.
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Table 3—Logit and Hazard Results for Firm Survival
Logit Marginal Ef. Hazard Marginal Ef.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment dummy -.782 -.128
(.36)∗∗ (.057)∗∗
Profitability in 1997 1.791 .294 -.677 -.021
(1.065)∗ (.175)∗ (.749) (.749)
Leverage in 1997 -2.18 -.358 1.346 .042
(.732)∗∗∗ (.118)∗∗∗ (.501)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Log sales in 1997 -.349 -.057 .268 .008
(.117)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.087)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Established in 1996-97 dummy -.992 -.196 .787 .033
(.525)∗ (.116)∗ (.391)∗∗ (.021)
1998 * Treatment dummy 2.02 .142
(.691)∗∗∗ (.080)∗
1999 * Treatment dummy 1.827 .120
(.697)∗∗∗ (.078)
2000 * Treatment dummy .65 .026
(.617) (.032)
2001 * Treatment dummy .03 .001
(.6) (.019)




Obs. 233 233 1132 1132
Pseudo R2 .194 .133
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1,
5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Treatment dummy equals 1 if the firms was a
client of the failed bank and 0 otherwise. Profitability is defined as profit from normal
activities / total assets. Leverage is defined as total liabilities / total assets. All
regressions include industry and year dummies. Marginal effects are calculated at the
means of independent variables.
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Table 4—Difference in Differences Analysis
Profitability Before After Difference t-statistic
Treatment -.044(119) -.042(95) -.002 -.048
Control .069(114) -.011(108) .080 1.875
Difference -.113 -.031 -.082
t-statistic -3.912 -.633
Liquidity Before After Difference t-statistic
Treatment .490(119) .413(95) .077 2.199
Control .585(114) .579(108) .006 .165
Difference -.095 -.166 .071
t-statistic -2.773 -4.372
Investments Before After Difference t-statistic
Treatment .206(58) -.169(95) .375 4.268
Control .225(49) -.04(99) .264 3.284
Difference -.019 -.13 .111
t-statistic -.239 -1.47
Notes: Number of firms is in brackets. Profitability is defined as profit
from normal activities / total assets. Liquidity is defined as (current assets -
current liabilities) / total assets. Investments are defined as change in fixed
assets / fixed assets.
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Table 5—Difference in Differences Analysis in Subsample
Profitability Before After Difference t-statistic
Treatment .014(84) -.030(67) -.044 1.078
Control .044(80) -.003(77) -.046 1.165
Difference .029 .027 -.002
t-statistic -1.419 -.506
Liquidity Before After Difference t-statistic
Treatment .000(84) -.114(67) -.114 2.050
Control -.010(80) -.024(77) -.014 .171
Difference -.010 .090 .100
t-statistic .322 -.948
Investments Before After Difference t-statistic
Treatment .194(43) -.086(67) -.280 3.080
Control .225(40) -.075(70) -.300 3.462
Difference .031 .011 -.020
t-statistic -.357 -.122
Notes: Number of firms is in brackets. Profitability is defined as profit
from normal activities / total assets. Liquidity is defined as (current assets
- current liabilities) / total assets. Investments are defined as change in
fixed assets / fixed assets.
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Table 6—Logit and Hazard Results for Firm Survival on Subsample
Logit Marginal Ef. Hazard Marginal Ef.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment dummy -.931 -.120
(.43)∗∗ (.054)∗∗
Profitability in 1997 6.452 .833 -4.697 -.116
(2.105)∗∗∗ (.257)∗∗∗ (1.666)∗∗∗ ( .041)∗∗∗
Leverage in 1997 -3.042 -.393 2.188 .054
(1.036)∗∗∗ (.134)∗∗∗ (.698)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗
Log sales in 1997 -.297 -.038 .237 .006
(.142)∗∗ ( .018)∗∗ (.118)∗∗ ( .003)∗∗
Established in 1996-97 dummy -.892 -.142 .484 .014
(.617) ( .117) (.459) ( .016)
1998 * Treatment dummy 2.41 .164
(.857)∗∗∗ ( .104)
1999 * Treatment dummy 2.982 .259
(1.119)∗∗∗ ( .19)
2000 * Treatment dummy .843 .029
(.749) ( .036)
2001 * Treatment dummy .163 .004
(.717) (.02)




Obs. 164 164 807 807
Pseudo R2 .2 .163
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1,
5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Treatment dummy equals 1 if the firm was a
client of the failed bank and 0 otherwise. Profitability is defined as profit from normal
activities / total assets. Leverage is defined as total liabilities / total assets. All
regressions include industry and year dummies. Marginal effects are calculated at the
means of independent variables.
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Table 7—Fixed Effect Estimation Results
Profitability Liquidity Investment
(1) (4) (5)
1998*Treatment dummy .047 -.017 .725
(.045) (.045) (1.06)
1999*Treatment dummy .046 -.054 1.005
(.047) (.025)∗∗ (1.093)
2000*Treatment dummy .049 -.038 .799
(.048) (.026) (1.093)
Obs. 946 948 704
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent levels, respectively. Treatment dummy equals 1 if the firms was a client
of the failed bank and 0 otherwise. All regressions include industry and year dummies.
Table 8—STLS Estimation Results
Profitability Liquidity
(1) (3)
Treatment dummy -.105 -.071
(.023)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗
1999 * Treatment dummy .054 -.041
(.045) (.034)
2000 * Treatment dummy .069 -.079
(.056) (.047)∗
2001 * Treatment dummy .065 -.062
(.046) (.049)
Obs. 946 946
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1,
5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The standard errors are bootstraped: based on
100 replications of the data the model is re-estimated revealing the variations of the
coefficients. Treatment dummy equals 1 if the firms was a client of the failed bank and
0 otherwise. All regressions include industry and year dummies.
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There are no stylized facts about the capital structure of small firms. There-
fore, in this paper I use firm data from 10 Western European countries to contrast
the sources of leverage across small and large firms. Specifically, I jointly evalu-
ate the explanatory power of firm-specific, country of incorporation institutional,
and macroeconomic factors. Using data that is more comprehensive in coverage
than that used in the existing research, I confirm the stylized facts of the capital
structure literature for large and listed firms, but I obtain contrasting evidence
for smaller companies: First, the country of incorporation carries much more
information for small firms, supporting the idea that small firms are more fi-
nancially constrained and face non-firm-specific hurdles in their capital structure
choice. Second, using two different leverage measures I show that the relation-
ship of firm size and tangibility to leverage is robust to the measure used for
listed, but not for unlisted, firms.
Keywords: capital structure, publicly traded and privately hold companies, Europe.
JEL classification: G32
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1 Introduction
More than a decade ago Rajan and Zingales (1995) wrote a pioneering empirical capital
structure study using international data. Since then a handful of papers in the field
have emerged providing new evidence mostly based on large listed companies.1 By
contrast, the current study examines whether the capital structure findings from large
companies are portable for small companies.
Differences between large and small firms have been pointed out in the firm growth
literature. Evans (1987) shows that small firms have higher growth rates than large
firms. More relevant to the study of capital structure, Carpenter and Petersen (2002)
show that the growth of small firms is constrained by internal finance. Therefore, it
appears very important to explore the capital structure of small firms as well as large
firms. Small firms are huge, when taken as a whole. The European Commission and
Eurostat (2001, page 15) claim that firms with less than 250 employees account for
two-thirds of all jobs and about half of the turnover of the non-agricultural sector in
the European Union.
Based on theoretical capital structure studies we know that firm capital structure
emerges from three sources: firm specific, country institutional, and macroeconomic
factors.2 The implications of theoretical studies have been tested in numerous empirical
papers. The most attention has been placed on firm-specific characteristics determin-
ing the capital structure (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 1984, Titman and Wessel 1988).
The latest study, based on U.S. firms (Frank and Goyal 2004), has found that firm
characteristics explain approximately 30% of within-country firm leverage variation.
Among firm variables, industry is a significant determinant of leverage. Industry alone
1This is largely due to the data availability. Stock market-listed firms are required to report annual
financial records by law, and usually the accounting standards for those firms across countries are the
same.
2For example, Harris and Raviv’s (1990) agency cost model shows that leverage is positively related
to firm value and liquidation value, and Myers (1977) points out the importance of firm growth
opportunities. In Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) trade-off theory, firms trade off the benefits from
tax shields of debt with potential bankruptcy costs. Hence, the tax rate is considered an important
determinant of firm leverage as is the legal and administrative costs of bankruptcy. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) stress the importance of investor protection in a country. Finally, Levy and Hennessy
(2007) spells out the importance of domestic macroeconomic factors.
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has been found to explain up to 25% of within-country leverage variation (Bradley,
Jarrell, and Kim 1984). Korajczyk and Levy (2003) show that for U.S. firms, macroe-
conomic variables can explain as high a share of leverage variation as firm factors. A
cross-country capital structure study by Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Mak-
simovic (2001) find that country dummies explain 43% of firm leverage variation in a
sample of 10 developing countries during the period 1980-90. In more detail, Desai,
Foley, and Hines (2004) show that the country tax rate explains the firm leverage level
in different countries. Hence, there is empirical evidence for the importance of all three
factors — firm, institutional, and macroeconomic — in determining firm capital struc-
ture. However, there is still a lack of studies spanning a large number of countries and
different firm types simultaneously.
In this paper, I study both the effects of firm and country factors on small as well
as on large firm leverage. This is important from two perspectives. First, I manage
to quantify the relative importance of different sources across firm size and secondly, I
overcome the possible omitted variable biases by including simultaneously factors from
different sources.
In my study, I use firm data from 10 Western European countries. This data set
has a number of attractive features for studying the determinants of capital structure.
First, the firm coverage of my sample is well-balanced across firm sizes and industries.
Second, my sample includes countries that have not yet been studied. Third, I use
recent data (1995-2002).
I perform the analysis by using two different leverage measures. First, I use the
broadest definition of leverage — total liabilities to total assets ratio. Second, I use a
narrower leverage definition — total debt over debt plus shareholders funds ratio. The
results are sensitive to the measure of leverage used for unlisted firms but not for listed
firms. The mean for unlisted firms is much smaller than for listed firms, 18 and 432
employees, respectively.
I use analysis of variance (ANOVA) to answer the question of the relative impor-
tance of different sources (firm and country characteristics) for explaining firm leverage.
I show that the influence of the factors on firm leverage differs across firm types. In
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particular, country factors are less important determinants of capital structure for
large firms than for small firms. This finding is in accord with Holmstrom and Tirole’s
(1997) prediction that small firms do not qualify to get external finance, and hence, the
domestic macroeconomic and institutional factors are likely to contribute more to the
determination of leverage. Large firms are more likely (Claessens and Schmukler 2007)
to cross-list in international equity markets, confirming that for those firms the domes-
tic financial market situation is less important. In a richer model, I add along with
country dummies a set of country-specific variables known in the literature to explain
firm leverage. Even after controlling for observable country variables, the country dum-
mies still explain 11% of leverage variation for listed firms and 25% for unlisted firms.
This finding suggests that there are significant (unobservable) institutional differences
across countries explaining firm leverage.
In the last part of my analysis, I estimate a leverage regression on pooled cross-
country data. I include in the regression firm-specific variables, country factors, and
country and year dummies. Regressions with narrow leverage as a dependent variable
produce consistent results across listed and unlisted firms. Coefficients of firm-specific
factors have the same signs as in previous capital structure studies. Interestingly the
signs are different for tangibility and size in the unlisted firm broad leverage regression.
The main difference between my leverage definitions is that the narrow leverage does
not include trade credit or other short-term non-debt liabilities. These items cover a
large share of unlisted firm liabilities. Still, I show that the larger share of those items
does not explain the different signs in leverage regressions.
In addition to the existing capital structure literature, my study is also related
to several research areas in the field of corporate finance and industrial organization.
First, it is closely connected to the literature on financial constraints and external
finance dependence. Second, it is related to the firm growth and firm size distribution
literature. Third, the stock market returns literature, which explores the significance
of firm, industry and country characteristics in explaining stock returns, is also linked
to the leverage of listed firms.3
3Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) show that stock prices move together more in poor economies than
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The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I briefly review the relevant
empirical studies of capital structure. There I also introduce my question of interest
and the empirical methodology for answering it. The data section follows and section
4 presents the results. Finally, I conclude and discuss the policy implications in section
5.
2 Determinants of Leverage and Methodology
As Myers (2003) notes, the present theories of capital structure are conditional. They
are relevant in different settings. This is well documented in empirical studies of
capital structure, which have found support for all theories. Firm behavior seems to
be a hybrid of the proposed theoretical foundations.4
In a recent study, Frank and Goyal (2004) use U.S. publicly-traded firms over 1950-
2000 and evaluate the importance of 36 factors (both firm- and economy-specific) on
leverage.5 They conclude that seven factors — median industry leverage, market-
to-book ratio, collateral, profits, dividend paying, logarithm of assets, and expected
inflation — are the most reliable.
The present empirical evidence on capital structure is that profitability as well as
market-to-book ratio and dividend paying are negatively related to leverage. More
profitable firms have larger internal slack and therefore a smaller need for external
finance. Market-to-book ratio proxies growth opportunities and are negatively related
to leverage due to the agency costs between the owners and bondholders. Dividend-
paying firms are considered to be financially unconstrained, and unconstrained firms
are expected to be less dependent on debt. Median industry leverage, collateral, log
of assets, and expected inflation are found to be positively related with leverage. It
in rich ones — country factors matter more for firm stock price in poor markets. Campbell, Lettau,
Malkiel, and Xu (2001) show that in the U.S., firm-specific factors gained importance over market
factors during 1967-1997. Hence, it would be interesting to analyse how the importance of firm,
industry and country effects has changed in terms of firm market leverage on long time-series data.
4Beside Myers (2003), see Harris and Raviv (1991) for a detailed review of theoretical and empirical
capital structure studies.
5Frank and Goyal (2004) use Compustat data.
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is natural to think that firms with more assets and more collateral available face less
obstacles in receiving debt, and, hence have higher leverage. The expectation of high
inflation makes credit cheaper today and therefore is positively related to leverage.
Industry leverage is important since firms in the same industry are exposed to the
same technology and therefore are likely to have a similar optimal financial structure.6
In contrast to Frank and Goyal (2004), Korajczyk and Levy (2003) find that the do-
mestic macroeconomic conditions, besides inflation, help determine a firm’s leverage.7
They show that financially unconstrained firms take into account the macroeconomic
situation when issuing debt or equity more than constrained firms, whose issue choice
follows less the macroeconomic movements in the country.
Few papers have taken the challenge to pool firm data from different countries and
shed light upon the effects of country differences on firm leverage. While controlling
for macroeconomic factors, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) and Schmukler and
Vesperoni (2001) try to pin down the importance of institutional factors. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) study the relation of firm financial structure to local
capital market development. They aggregate firm level data to country averages. Their
sample consisted of 30 developed and developing countries in 1981-1991. They find a
statistically significant negative relation between the stock market development and the
debt/equity ratio. They also observe a positive relationship between the local banking
sector size and leverage.
Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001) are interested in the effect of a country’s financial
liberalization on firm capital structure. Their analysis is based on seven developing
countries from Asia and South America in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Interestingly, they
find that after financial liberalization (after achieving access to international debt and
equity markets), the debt-to-equity ratios did not change, but the share of short-term
6MacKay and Phillips (2005) show that not only industry dummies but also firm position in its in-
dustry matters (e.g. proximity to median industry capital/labor ratio). Frank and Goyal (2004) show
that omitting industry from the leverage regression turns many other firm characteristics significant.
Hence, apparently industry captures a number of different effects.
7They use three macroeconomic variables — 2-year aggregate domestic non-financial corporation
profit growth and 2-year equity market returns and commercial paper spreads — to describe overall
tendencies in the market.
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debt increased. So financial liberalization alters debt structure but not the debt/equity
ratio.
The cross-country studies cited above show that some institutional factors are quan-
tifiable and significant determinants of firm leverage even after controlling for macroe-
conomic variables.8 In my research, I focus on the significance of country factors in
leverage estimation and whether the effects of those factors are the same across firm
types. Considering that previous research on the topic has been done on relatively
large companies my study will shed light on small firm capital structure as well.
An important issue for empirical studies and their comparability is the precise
definition of leverage used. Rajan and Zingales (1995) offer six different definitions of
leverage.9 Due to data limitations, I use two of them. First, the broadest definition
of leverage — ratio of total liabilities to total assets — does not differentiate between
the different sources of debt (accounts payable, bank debt, or bonds). Second, the
narrow definition of leverage is the ratio of total debt (short- plus long-term credit) to
debt plus shareholders funds. From now on I call the first measure “broad leverage”
or “Leverage 1” and the second measure “narrow leverage” or “Leverage 2”. I use
only book leverage in my analysis because for unlisted firms the market ratio does
not exist.10 The theory of capital structure refers to the liabilities that are used for
financing. Hence, the predictions of theory are more closely related to the narrow
leverage measure (the broad measure includes also short-term items which might be
used for transactions instead). Narrow leverage corresponds to the leverage Rajan and
Zingales (1995) use in their empirical analysis.
I contrast the importance of firm characteristics with country characteristics in
8Frank and Goyal (2004) use only U.S. data and therefore only observe the time variation of country
variables while not observing cross-sectional variation.
9Rajan and Zingales (1995) divide the leverage measures into two groups. The first group includes
measures that evaluate the ratio of debt to assets, where the definitions of debt and assets vary
across different measures. The debt can be measured as broadly as total liabilities. The second group
includes measures that evaluate interest coverage.
10For listed firms I computed both book and market leverage ratios. I estimated exactly the same
leverage specification as Rajan and Zingales (1995) and received similar estimates (the results of those
estimates are available upon request). Hence, I conclude that my data quality is comparable to the
data used in the existing capital structure studies.
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determining the firm leverage ratio. I ask whether country effects have the same
influence on all types of firms in a country. Is listed firm leverage determined by
the same factors as that of unlisted firms? Do firms of different size have the same
leverage determinants?
In answering these questions, I use two approaches. First, I perform an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) of leverage for detecting the importance of the size, industry, and
country factors in leverage variation. Second, I use regression analyses for comparing
my study to previous research in the field.
The ANOVA exercise explains how much of the variation of the variable of interest
is explained by different sets of variables. I use four sets of explanatory variables —
size, industry, country, and year.11 I categorize firms into five size classes12 and use the
3-digit NACE industry classification (I have 51 industries).
Besides analysing how many different types of factors explain the leverage variation,
I run a simple leverage regression to observe the direction of the effects. The basic form
of the regression is the following:
Yijt = α + βj + γt + δXijt + εijt,
where i is the index of firm, j is the index of country, and t is the index of year.
Xijt contains the firm-specific variables profitability, tangibility, logarithm of assets,
and median industry leverage. βj is the country fixed effect and γt is the year effect.
εij is the random disturbance. In the next step, I am also interested in determining
the country factors that matter to a firm’s capital structure. Therefore, I add country-
specific variables to the regression:
Yijt = α + βj + γt + δXijt + ζCjt + εijt,
where Cjt are the country variables. Many different country characteristics have
been proposed by earlier studies. Since some of those variables are strongly correlated
11The ANOVA estimation finds the total sum of squares of the dependent variable (SST), which
is decomposed to the sum of squares of the model (SSR) and the sum of squares of the error term
(SSE). Note that the ratio SSR/SST is the R2 in the OLS regression. Also, ANOVA calculates for
each explanatory variable the partial sum of squares.
12Class 1 firms have total assets smaller than $1 million. Class 2 firms have total assets between $1
and 2 million. Class 3 firms have total assets between $2 and 5 million. Class 4 firms have total assets
between $5 to 50 million and finally, Class 5 firms have total assets above $50 million. The median
number of employees in each size group is 10, 15, 22, 55 and 391, respectively.
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with each other, I selected five measures to pin down the country effect. From macro
factors I include GDP growth and inflation as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996)
did. GDP growth rate proxies the firms’ growth opportunities. Since high-growth
firms are expected to rely more on internal funds, the correlation of this variable with
leverage is expected to be negative. The correlation of inflation and leverage is expected
to be positive. As Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) note, it is important to consider the
capital constraints of financial intermediaries. Total domestic savings to GDP proxies
the capital supply of the domestic financial sector. A higher savings ratio should cause
higher leverage levels. From institutional factors, I add the statutory corporate tax rate
(including local taxes) and total market capitalization to GDP. Higher taxes should
cause higher leverage while higher stock market development is expected to lead to
lower levels of leverage.
3 Data
I use firm-level data from the Amadeus (Analyse Major Databases from European
Sources) database, collected by Bureau Van Dijk. The company accounting statements
are harmonized by Bureau Van Dijk making the cross-country comparisons reliable.
Data are also available for unlisted firms. Due to national legislations, the coverage of
financial variables varies across countries. This limits the number of countries included
in the analysis13 and affects my choice of variables.
The firms selected are the Amadeus Top 1 million companies (online version in
February and March 2004). Those firms had to meet at least one of the following
criteria to be included in Amadeus: operating revenue greater than 1 million euros,
total assets greater than 2 million euros, and number of employees greater than 10.
For firms from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy these cut offs were
1.5, 3 and 15, respectively. The European Commission defines firms with less than
10 employees as micro-enterprises. Hence, the Amadeus inclusion criteria bias the
sample only against the smallest firms but provide an excellent possibility to analyse
13Amadeus data cover firms from 37 European countries.
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the behavior of small and medium-sized firms.
I exclude a firm if: total assets were not given or were negative; the sum of detailed
balance sheet items deviated more than 5% from total assets given; shareholders funds,
current liabilities or non-current liabilities were not given; industry was missing; it was
from the financial intermediation sector;14 or the leverage ratio was less than 3 times
the inter quartile range (IQR) away from 25th percentile or more than 3 times the IQR
away from the 75th percentile (eliminating outliers).
My study is based on firms from 10 Western European countries. I compare the
coverage of the final sample I use with data from “Enterprises in Europe” provided
by the European Commission and Eurostat. These data cover the number of firms,
employment and production of firms from the European Union and the European Free
Trade Agreement countries. “Enterprises in Europe” is expected to cover the whole
population of firms in the country.15 I assess the representativeness of Amadeus data
across firm size and industry. For comparison I divide firms into three size and six
industry classes.16
Table 1 in the appendix presents the correlations of firm size distributions across
industries and industry distribution correlations for each country. Amadeus data are
well representative for most of the countries, except Germany and Switzerland. From
Germany a small number of mainly large firms are covered by my data.17 The in-
dustry representativeness of Amadeus is good on average. Manufacturing firms are
over-sampled from all countries, while services, trade, and construction are under-
represented in some countries.18
14The financial intermediation sector has a specific balance sheet structure. It is standard to disre-
gard these firms in capital structure studies.
15For more details about “Enterprises in Europe” see Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2002).
16Note that firms are divided into size classes based on the number of employees. Only two-thirds
of firms in my data report employment. Therefore, the coverage figures presented should be taken as
proxies for the coverage of a full sample.
17Small- and medium-sized German firms are not legally forced to disclose (Desai, Gompers, and
Lerner 2003).
18The representativeness of the Amadeus data is also presented in Gomez-Salvador, Messina, and
Vallanti (2004). They find that firms in the Amadeus data cover on average 25% of the employment
in National Labor Force Surveys. Different industries are well represented in Amadeus data. Gomez-
Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti (2004) conclude that the industry coverage is similar across countries
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The number of firms reaches 482,783 in 2000 in my sample. This is an order of
magnitude more than in any present cross-country capital structure study of which I
am aware. The existing cross-country studies use mainly the Global Vantage database
(Rajan and Zingales 1995 and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1996) or International
Finance Corporations (IFC) data (Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic
2001, Schmukler and Vesperoni 2001). In Rajan and Zingales’s (1995) study of seven
developed countries the largest sample of firms is from the U.S. (2583 firms) and the
smallest from Italy (118 firms). In Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic
(2001) the number of firms from each country remains below one hundred. Table 2
in the appendix presents the sources and sample sizes of the most cited cross-country
capital structure studies. The average firm size in those databases is much larger than
in my sample. Therefore, my study gives a better understanding of the average firm
leverage.
Table 1 presents the balance sheet structure of the firms in my sample in the
year 2000. Panel A has information about listed firms. The first four columns are
comparable to Rajan and Zingales’s (1995) Table 2. French and Italian firms’ share of
long-term debt is much lower in my sample. More than half of the firms from those
countries do not report any long-term debt. My sample of firms is larger than Rajan
and Zingales and it is likely that their sample covered a larger fraction of firms with
long-term debt.19 An interesting finding from comparing listed (Panel A) and unlisted
(Panel B) firms is that the fraction of current liabilities is much larger for unlisted firms
while the share of non-current liabilities as well as shareholder funds is larger for listed
firms.
Table 2 presents mean and median leverage ratios across countries, stock market-
listed and market-unlisted firms and two different leverage measures in 2000. Both
leverage measures are higher for unlisted firms.20 This confirms the finding of Table 1
that shareholders’ funds are a more common source of finance for listed firms. Broad
and stable over time.
19See also a discussion about French and Italian firms’ balance sheet structure in Giannetti (2003,
page 190-191), who used the Amadeus sample as well.
20One exception is the narrow leverage in France. French unlisted firms use very little debt finance.
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leverage is higher than narrow leverage and its level varies less across countries. The
median broad leverage varies from 86% in Italy to 67% in Finland among unlisted firms
and from 64% in Portugal to 50% in the United Kingdom (means are slightly lower)
among listed firms. Median narrow leverage varies from 51% in Portugal to 0% in Italy
among unlisted firms and from 51% in Portugal to 15% in Sweden among listed firms.
The large difference between leverage measures in Italy documents that most of the
Italian firms’ financing comes from short-term non-debt financial sources.
I also make use of country-specific variables. Macro data (inflation, GDP growth
ratio, and saving ratio) and capital market size info (total market capitalization to
GDP) are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. The statutory corpo-
rate income tax rate is adopted from Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2002).
4 Results
4.1 Analysis of Variance
In this section, I explore how much different sources explain leverage variation. I use
pooled data across firms from different countries and over eight years. Pooled data
analysis is more powerful than simple cross-sectional data analysis since it allows the
incorporation of both firm- and country-specific factors plus time invariant country
effects.
Table 3 Panel A presents the ANOVA results for listed firm broad leverage. The
largest share (about 50%) of leverage variation is explained by industry dummies. Size
dummies and country dummies explain 20% and 18%, respectively. In the second
column, I add firm profitability and tangibility. The results seem to be robust to the
inclusion of the firm-specific variables and the model gains 2% in descriptive power.
In the last column of Table 3, I include in addition to firm characteristics the country-
specific variables. The explanatory share of country dummies drops to 11%. Hence,
unobservable country characteristics explain only 11% of listed firm leverage variation.
Table 3 Panel B presents the comparable ANOVA results for listed firm narrow leverage.
Differently from broad leverage, the inclusion of firm-specific characteristics decreases
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the explanatory power of size and industry dummies significantly while the inclusion of
country-specific variables does not decrease the explanatory share of country dummies.
Table 4 Panel A presents the corresponding results for unlisted companies’ broad
leverage. Country dummies explain close to half while industry and size dummies ex-
plain approximately one-fourth and one-fifth of leverage variation, respectively. The
inclusion of firm characteristics in the second column does not change the results.
Hence, the well-known firm characteristics contribute little to the leverage determi-
nation. The inclusion of country variables in column 3 decreases the significance of
country dummies by half. Still, a large 25% of leverage variation is explained by
unobservable country institutional factors. Table 4 Panel B presents the compara-
ble ANOVA results for unlisted firm narrow leverage. For this leverage definition the
country dummies are even more prevalent. The size and industry of the firm explain a
minor share of leverage variation.
An interesting finding from comparing listed and unlisted firms is that while indus-
try effects explain approximately 2.5 times more than country effects for listed firms,
for unlisted firms the pattern is reversed — country effects explain roughly two times
more than industry effects (for the narrow definition of leverage even five times more).
Hence, it seems that the country of incorporation bears more valuable information for
the unlisted firms. Both observable and unobservable country factors explain a larger
share of the leverage variation of unlisted firms.
One explanation for the different influence of country factors for listed and unlisted
firms is that listed firms have better financing opportunities. Being listed on the stock
market can be considered as a signal of good quality and therefore the potential financ-
ing sources for those firms are not limited to domestic financiers. Claessens, Klingebiel,
and Schmukler (2006) report that for high-income countries the market capitalization
of international firms (firms that cross-list abroad) to total market capitalization is
56% in 2000. This explains why listed firm leverage variation is less explained by coun-
try factors compared to unlisted firms. Hence, for listed firms the industry technology
carries the most important part of leverage determination. Unlisted companies on the
other hand rely mainly on finance from the domestic market. Therefore, the country
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factors matter a lot in explaining leverage variation.
Note that the adjusted R2’s are quite low. In a comparable study Booth, Aivazian,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) received a R2 above 40%. On the other hand,
Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001) reported a R2 as low as 4-12%. An open question is
to what extent the low explanatory power of the existing empirical studies correspond
to the measurement error in leverage ratios or alternatively to the lack of dynamic
modelling.21
Since stock market-listed firms are on average much larger than unlisted firms, it
is interesting to see how the firms from different size groups respond to industry and
country effects. In Table 5 Panel A the results are presented for listed firm broad
leverage.22 Firms from the three smallest size groups are combined since the number
of observations in each class separately were small. The industry dummies explain a
larger share of leverage variation compared to country effects in all size classes. The
same holds for narrow leverage (Table 5 Panel B).
Table 6 presents the results for unlisted firms. Up to the fourth size class of firms,
country factors explain the biggest share of broad leverage variation (Panel A). The
industry and country characteristics explain roughly the same share of leverage vari-
ation for firms in the fourth size group. The largest firms face a reversed pattern —
industry effects largely dominate the country effects. In other words, we observe the
dilution of country effects on firm leverage when firms become larger. The largest
unlisted firms share a common feature with listed firms — industry effects dominate
country effects. Hence, it is important to distinguish the size of the firm besides the
traded/nontraded firm distinction. It appears that being listed does not affect the
sources of capital structure for large firms. This might be since large firms are more
likely to go public (Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales 1998) as well as more likely to issue
equity in international markets (Claessens and Schmukler 2007). Interestingly for the
narrow leverage definition (Table 6 Panel B) we observe the same pattern for all size
classes — country factors remain the most important factor for all firms irrespective
21See Strebulaev (2007) for details about dynamic capital structure.
22Firm and country variables are not introduced here since they do not change the pattern of results.
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of size. Table 7 shows the liability structure across size groups. Current liabilities
are far more important for the smallest firms (Size 1). The liability structure of the
largest firms (Size 5) resembles most the liability structure of listed firms in Table 2.
The different results found in ANOVA on the size groups of firms while using different
leverage measures call for attention.
The analysis in this section shows that both firm- and country-specific variables are
important for explaining leverage variation. The relative importance of those factors
varies by firm type. Small and unlisted firms are affected more by country charac-
teristics irrespective of the leverage measure used. Half of the country explanatory
power emerges from unobservable institutional factors for unlisted firms. Therefore, it
is important to consider a firm’s country of incorporation in a study of leverage even
after controlling for observable country factors.
4.2 Regression Analysis
As in the ANOVA analysis I use pooled data in the regression analysis. I compare
the results of this section with findings from earlier studies on capital structure. Table
8 reports the results. All regressions include country and year dummies, which are
jointly statistically significant in all specifications.
Panel A of Table 8 reports the leverage regression results for listed firms. Columns
1 and 2 report the results for the broad leverage measure and column 3 and 4 for
narrow leverage. All regressions include country and year dummies. In the 1st and
3rd column, no country-specific time-varying variables are included into the leverage
estimation. All firm-specific factors are statistically significant in all specifications.
Size23 and tangibility are positively related to leverage. Profitability is negatively
related to leverage. The signs coincide with the findings of earlier capital structure
studies on firms from developed countries (Rajan and Zingales 1995). In the 2nd and
4th columns, I add a set of country time-varying variables. The goodness of fit almost
does not change. As in ANOVA, the inclusion of country-specific variables absorbs
23All regression results are robust if, instead of the logarithm of total assets, the discrete size variable
— the five size groups exploited in the ANOVA section — is used.
48
some part of the explanatory power of country dummies. Only two out of five country
variables are statistically significant for the broad leverage regression and three for
the narrow leverage regression. The higher savings ratio to GDP and lower stock
market capitalization are related to higher leverage. Still note that the coefficients for
country-specific variables are very small.
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results for unlisted firms. The coefficients on all
firm characteristics in all specifications are statistically significant. For the narrow
leverage measure (column 3 and 4) the coefficients have the same signs as for listed
companies but the signs are negative for tangibility and size for the broad leverage
regressions. Larger firms as well as firms with a higher share of tangible assets have
lower broad leverage. Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) also
found a negative coefficient on tangibility in their sample of firms from developing
countries. They define leverage as total liabilities over total liabilities plus net worth,
which corresponds to my broad leverage definition. It is well known for transition
countries to have a negative coefficient for tangibility (Cornelli, Portes, and Schaffer
1998). Cornelli, Portes, and Schaffer’s result was robust for two leverage definitions —
total debt to total assets and total bank debt to total assets. Therefore, the negative
coefficient in front of tangibility in my broad leverage regression of unlisted firms from
Western European countries is consistent with the results from less developed countries.
The negative sign in front of size is puzzling.24 One explanation for the negative relation
between size and leverage may be that size proxies firm growth opportunity, which is
expected to be negatively related to leverage. This is supported by Evans’s (1987)
finding that small firms grow more quickly.
Four out of five country variables in unlisted firm leverage regressions have highly
statistically significant coefficients for both leverage measures. As in the case of listed
firms the coefficients have very low values. The negative signs for GDP growth in
both leverage measure regressions contradict theoretical predictions, as do the negative
coefficients on inflation and savings rate in the broad leverage regression.
24In fact, Rajan and Zingales (1995) found a negative significant coefficient in front of size for
German listed firms.
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The main difference between the two leverage measures used in my analysis is
the inclusion of trade credit and other non-debt current liabilities in the broad leverage
measure. As was shown in the section on the ANOVA analysis, unlisted firms (see Table
1) and small firms (see Table 7) have on average a larger share of current liabilities.
This may be considered as a potential explanation of the negative signs in front of
tangibility and the log size in the broad leverage regressions. To see whether the
larger share of current liabilities explains those negative signs I run the broad leverage
measure regression across size groups. Table 9 presents the results. In Panel A for
listed firm regressions we see that the signs are really different for the smallest firms —
tangibility as well as size enter with negative coefficients. From Panel B for unlisted
firms we see that the signs in front of tangibility and the logarithm of size change across
size groups but we can not conclude that the signs are negative for smaller firms and
positive for larger firms. Therefore, the larger proportion of current liabilities does not
explain the flipped signs in the broad leverage regression.
I run the regressions also on cross-sectional data to see whether the results are stable
over time and over countries. I find firm-specific factors to have stable coefficients over
time for both leverage measures. The coefficients in front of country-specific time-
varying variables change signs and significance over the years. This might be explained
by the lack of variation in economy-wide variables across countries due to the similarity
of countries in my study. I observe different signs on estimated coefficients in front of
firm-specific variables in some country regressions compared to the pooled regression.25
5 Conclusions
I use a large European firm data set to study the sources of leverage variation and pro-
vide the first available evidence on capital structure determinants for small firms. The
importance of firm versus country factors in driving firm capital structure varies across
firm types. Country-specific factors are the most important for small and unlisted
firms, suggesting that these firms, which are likely to operate under borrowing con-
25More specific results of year-specific and country-specific regressions are available on request.
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straints, face non-firm-specific determinants of leverage. Specifically, I control for five
country-specific time-varying macroeconomic variables while capturing the effects of
time-invariant unmeasured country factors (such as institutions) using a set of dummy
variables. I find that the share of leverage variation related to country-specific un-
observable factors for listed and unlisted firms is approximately 10 and 25 percent,
respectively. This is an important finding for at least two reasons: First, apparently a
change in domestic macroeconomic variables and/or financial institutions can change
a firms financial structure. Second, research in the field of capital structure should pay
more attention to the investigation of country-of-incorporation factors.
I use two leverage measures in my analysis and I find that the results are robust to
the measure used for the listed firms but not for unlisted firms. The main difference
between the two measures is that the broad one includes trade credit and other current
liabilities. My findings based on listed firms are in accord with the existing theory and
empirics of firm capital structure in that I find a positive relationship between firm
size and leverage as well as between tangibility and leverage. The results for unlisted
firms, however, are similar to the typical findings in the literature only when based
on the narrow leverage measure (debt over debt plus shareholders funds). In contrast,
when I use the broad leverage measure (total liabilities over total assets), the regression
analysis results in a negative leverage effect of total assets and of the share of tangible
assets to total assets. The puzzling new evidence reported here for firm types that
have so far escaped investigation motivates future research in this area.
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Table 2 — Two leverage measures across listed and unlisted firms
Country Listed firms Unlisted firms
Leverage1 Leverage2 Leverage1 Leverage2
Belgium Mean .59 .36 .72 .46
Median .58 .34 .76 .45
St. Dev. .23 .27 .24 .36
Number of firms 84 84 28,194 28,194
Finland Mean .51 .29 .65 .39
Median .54 .28 .67 .34
St. Dev. .16 .20 .23 .32
Number of firms 111 111 9,549 9,549
France Mean .57 .30 .71 .23
Median .60 .28 .74 .12
St. Dev. .22 .24 .25 .32
Number of firms 703 703 136,868 136,868
Germany Mean .54 .36 .73 .40
Median .57 .33 .77 .35
St. Dev. .25 .28 .24 .38
Number of firms 558 558 6,637 6,637
Italy Mean .57 .26 .81 .23
Median .59 .20 .86 .00
St. Dev. .21 .23 .18 .33
Number of firms 127 127 86,209 86,209
Portugal Mean .62 .49 .72 .50
Median .64 .51 .74 .51
St. Dev. .22 .26 .20 .31
Number of firms 62 62 7830 7830
Spain Mean .50 .33 .70 .35
Median .55 .36 .75 .28
St. Dev. .23 .23 .26 .35
Number of firms 154 154 113,711 113,711
Sweden Mean .53 .23 .72 .38
Median .55 .15 .75 .34
St. Dev. .20 .24 .22 .36
Number of firms 229 229 31,834 31,834
Switzerland Mean .53 .34 .64 .43
Median .56 .32 .68 .46
St. Dev. .18 .20 0.24 .32
Number of firms 181 181 349 349
United Kingdom Mean .49 .29 .69 .46
Median .50 .26 .70 .42
St. Dev. .23 .25 .28 .40
Number of firms 1,010 1,010 583,83 58,383
Notes: Leverage1 is defined as total liabilities over total assets. Leverage2 is defined
as debt over debt plus equity.
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Table 3 — Anova results for listed firms
Panel A — broad leverage
Source SSR SSR SSR
Size 20 20% 19 18% 20 17%
( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 5 )
Industry 46 47% 51 46% 51 44%
( 48 ) ( 48 ) ( 48 )
Country 17 18% 19 17% 13 11%
( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 )
Year 4 4% 4 4% 1 1%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 98 111 114
Total 1,027 1,027 1,027
Firms ch. No Yes Yes
Country ch. No No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.11 0.11
Obs. 20,686 20,686 20,686
Panel B — narrow leverage
Source SSR SSR SSR
Size 25 19% 20 11% 20 11%
( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 5 )
Industry 58 44% 46 26% 47 25%
( 48 ) ( 48 ) ( 48 )
Country 24 18% 24 13% 26 14%
( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 )
Year 2 2% 2 1% 1 1%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 131 180 185
Total 1,395 1,395 1,395
Firms ch. No Yes Yes
Country ch. No No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.13 0.13
Obs. 20,686 20,686 20,686
Notes: Numbers in cells refer to the partial sum of squares
(SSR). The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of in-
dicators. Broad leverage is defined as total liabilities to total
assets. Narrow leverage is defined as debt to debt plus share-
holders funds. Industry is 3-digit NACE. Firm size classes:
Class 1 total assets smaller than $1 million, Class 2 total as-
sets between $1 and 2 million, Class 3 total assets between $2
and 5 million, Class 4 total assets between $5 to 50 million,
and Class 5 total assets above $50 million. Firm character-
istics are tangible assets to total assets and profit to assets
ratios. Country characteristics are GDP growth rate, infla-
tion, savings to GDP, statutory corporate income tax rate,
and total market capitalization to GDP.
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Table 4 — Anova results for unlisted firms
Panel A — broad leverage
Source SSR SSR SSR
Size 2,508 21% 2,448 21% 2,434 20%
( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 5 )
Industry 2,876 24% 2,708 23% 2,709 23%
( 51 ) ( 51 ) ( 51 )
Country 6,082 52% 5,990 50% 2,953 25%
( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 )
Year 50 0% 52 0% 46 0%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 11,773 11,936 11,971
Total 180,232 180,232 180,232
Firms ch. No Yes Yes
Country ch. No No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07
Obs. 3,035,109 3,035,109 3,035,109
Panel B — narrow leverage
Source SSR SSR SSR
Size 1,746 5% 1,614 5% 1,612 5%
( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 5 )
Industry 4,375 14% 2,969 8% 2,968 8%
( 51 ) ( 51 ) ( 51 )
Country 21,611 68% 16,490 47% 9,262 26%
( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 )
Year 222 1% 187 1% 137 0%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 31,992 35,160 35,229
Total 375,965 375,965 375,965
Firms ch. No Yes Yes
Country ch. No No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09
Obs. 3,035,109 3,035,109 3,035,109
Notes: Numbers in cells refer to the partial sum of squares (SSR).
The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of indicators. Broad
leverage is defined as total liabilities to total assets. Narrow lever-
age is defined as debt to debt plus shareholders funds. Industry is
3-digit NACE. Firm size classes: Class 1 total assets smaller than
$1 million, Class 2 total assets between $1 and 2 million, Class 3
total assets between $2 and 5 million, Class 4 total assets between
$5 to 50 million, and Class 5 total assets above $50 million. Firm
characteristics are tangible assets to total assets and profit to assets
ratios. Country characteristics are GDP growth rate, inflation, sav-
ings to GDP, statutory corporate income tax rate, and total market
capitalization to GDP.
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Table 5 — Anova results for listed firms
by size classes
Panel A — broad leverage
Source Size<4 Size 4 Size 5
Industry 14 70% 21 61% 37 71%
( 39 ) ( 46 ) ( 47 )
Country 4 21% 8 24% 13 24%
( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 )
Year 1 3% 4 11% 1 2%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 20 35 52
Total 91 381 529
Adj. R-squared 0.18 0.08 0.09
Obs. 1,086 6,269 13,331
Panel B — narrow leverage
Source Size<4 Size 4 Size 5
Industry 9 59% 20 58% 54 70%
( 39 ) ( 46 ) ( 47 )
Country 5 34% 11 31% 16 21%
( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 )
Year 1 3% 1 3% 4 5%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 15 35 78
Total 102 458 792
Adj. R-squared 0.10 0.07 0.09
Obs. 1,086 6,269 13,331
Notes:Numbers in cells refer to the partial sum of squares
(SSR). The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of indi-
cators. Broad leverage is defined as total liabilities to total as-
sets. Narrow leverage is defined as debt to debt plus sharehold-
ers funds. Industry is 3-digit NACE. Firm size classes: Class 1
total assets smaller than $1 million, Class 2 total assets between
$1 and 2 million, Class 3 total assets between $2 and 5 million,
Class 4 total assets between $5 to 50 million, and Class 5 total
assets above $50 million.
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Table 6 — Anova results for unlisted firms by size classes
Panel A — broad leverage
Source Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5
Industry 429 38% 476 22% 1,017 28% 1,436 46% 434 71%
( 50 ) ( 50 ) ( 51 ) ( 51 ) ( 51 )
Country 674 59% 1,599 74% 2,286 63% 1,620 52% 159 26%
( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 )
Year 21 2% 14 1% 13 0% 15 0% 2 0%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 1,136 2154 3,610 3,113 608
Total 45,337 32177 45766 44987 9497
Adj. R-squared 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06
Obs. 853,024 632,717 737,598 681,042 130,728
Panel B — narrow leverage
Source Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5
Industry 1,311 16% 822 11% 1,052 14% 1,602 22% 517 22%
( 50 ) ( 50 ) ( 51 ) ( 51 ) ( 51 )
Country 6,652 81% 6,276 82% 5,956 78% 5,490 76% 1,879 78%
( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 ) ( 10 )
Year 95 1% 41 1% 82 1% 33 0% 6 0%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 8,167 7,680 7,626 7,186 2,395
Total 114,315 70,423 85,797 835,29 17,296
Adj. R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.14
Obs. 853,024 632,717 737,598 681,042 130,728
Notes:Numbers in cells refer to the partial sum of squares (SSR). The numbers in parentheses
refer to the number of indicators. Broad leverage is defined as total liabilities to total assets.
Narrow leverage is defined as debt to debt plus shareholders funds. Industry is 3-digit NACE.
Firm size classes: Class 1 total assets smaller than $1 million, Class 2 total assets between $1
and 2 million, Class 3 total assets between $2 and 5 million, Class 4 total assets between $5 to
50 million, and Class 5 total assets above $50 million.
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Table 7 — Liability structure across countries and sizes
Current Non-current Shareholder Number of firms
liabilities liabilities funds
Belgium Size 1 67 22 11 7,045
Size 2 51 22 27 6,339
Size 3 47 23 30 8,581
Size 4 50 22 28 6,341
Size 5 45 23 31 1,223
Finland Size 1 47 23 30 4,142
Size 2 40 24 35 1,701
Size 3 36 29 35 1,634
Size 4 32 29 39 1,750
Size 5 30 31 40 505
France Size 1 93 22 -15 49,099
Size 2 63 10 27 32,392
Size 3 58 12 31 29,931
Size 4 53 15 31 24,362
Size 5 46 20 34 4,875
Germany Size 1 42 39 18 640
Size 2 43 41 16 632
Size 3 39 39 22 1,157
Size 4 36 33 30 3,194
Size 5 34 34 32 2,605
Italy Size 1 79 10 11 16,953
Size 2 74 10 16 25,728
Size 3 70 11 19 31,748
Size 4 63 15 22 27,887
Size 5 56 18 26 3,165
Portugal Size 1 57 21 22 1,408
Size 2 53 22 24 1,690
Size 3 51 22 27 2,189
Size 4 47 22 31 2,261
Size 5 41 25 34 411
Spain Size 1 64 15 22 54,188
Size 2 53 16 30 28,635
Size 3 47 18 35 27,028
Size 4 46 18 36 19,081
Size 5 43 20 37 2,276
Sweden Size 1 50 26 25 13,097
Size 2 40 30 30 6,525
Size 3 33 38 29 6,758
Size 4 31 39 30 6,554
Size 5 30 39 31 1,639
Switzerland Size 1 43 2 55 3
Size 2 43 16 41 4
Size 3 30 52 19 22
Size 4 24 36 40 181
Size 5 26 35 39 323
United Kingdom Size 1 81 152 -133 5,703
Size 2 61 21 18 6,717
Size 3 48 22 30 19,316
Size 4 47 24 29 23,212
Size 5 41 30 29 7,251
Notes: Firm size classes: Class 1 total assets smaller than $1 million, Class 2 total
assets between $1 and 2 million, Class 3 total assets between $2 and 5 million, Class 4
total assets between $5 to 50 million, and Class 5 total assets above $50 million. The
smallest firms in France and the UK had on average negative shareholder funds, which
explains the bizzare figures.
62
Table 8 — Leverage regression in 1995-2002
Panel A — Listed firms
Leverage 1 Leverage 2
Const. .005 -.413 -.037 -.002
(.034) (.065)∗∗∗ (.033) (.073)
Tangibility .042 .04 .15 .151
(.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Profitability -.095 -.096 -.119 -.119
(.01)∗∗∗ (.01)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Log assets .016 .016 .019 .019
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Industry leverage .751 .75 .501 .502
(.043)∗∗∗ (.043)∗∗∗ (.035)∗∗∗ (.035)∗∗∗








Market Capitalization 0 -.0003
(.00007)∗∗ (.00008)∗∗∗
Obs. 20686 20686 20686 20686
R2 .111 .114 .13 .133
Notes: Leverage1 is defined as total liabilities over total assets. Leverage2 is defined
as debt over debt plus equity. Standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors are based
on clustering across firms. All regressions include country and year dummies.
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Panel B — Unlisted firms
Leverage 1 Leverage 2
Const. .279 .313 .241 .184
(.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Tangibility -.022 -.022 .127 .127
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗
Profitability -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Log assets -.015 -.015 .011 .011
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.0002)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗
Industry leverage .764 .764 .390 .389
(.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗








Market Capitalization -.00009 -.0002
(9.30e-06)∗∗∗ (.00002)∗∗∗
Obs. 3035109 3035109 3035109 3035109
R2 .059 .059 .09 .09
Notes: Leverage1 is defined as total liabilities over total assets. Leverage2 is defined
as debt over debt plus equity. Standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors are based
on clustering across firms. All regressions include country and year dummies.
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Table 9 — Broad leverage regression in 1995-2002, across size classes
Panel A — Listed firms
Size 1-3 Size 4 Size 5
Const. 1.182 .064 -.032
(.264)∗∗∗ (.111) (.043)
Tangibility -.121 .107 .023
(.102) (.027)∗∗∗ (.016)
Profitability -.074 -.081 -.143
(.016)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗
Log assets -.07 .007 .018
(.018)∗∗∗ (.009) (.002)∗∗∗
Industry leverage .16 .707 .79
(.16) (.069)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗
Obs. 1086 6269 13331
R2 .128 .093 .123
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Standard errors are based on clustering across firms. All regressions include country
and year dummies.
Panel B — Unlisted firms
Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5
Const. .355 .643 .376 -.058 -.11
(.012)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.02)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗
Tangibility .03 -.061 -.069 -.019 .032
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.01)∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Profitability -.0007 -.615 -.001 -.227 -.253
(.0005) (.051)∗∗∗ (.002) (.086)∗∗∗ (.075)∗∗∗
Log assets .0006 -.043 -.026 .004 -.005
(.0009) (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Industry leverage .506 .578 .743 1 1.193
(.013)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.037)∗∗∗
Obs. 853024 632717 737598 681042 130728
R2 .022 .159 .079 .088 .075
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Standard errors are based on clustering across firms. All regressions include country
and year dummies.
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APPENDIX Table 2 — Representativeness of data,
Amadeus data versus “Enterprises in Europe”
Country Correlation of size distribution Correlation of









United Kingdom .492 .148
Notes: Size and industry distributions are calculated based on the number
of firms. Firms were divided into 3 size classes: 10-49, 50-249, and more
than 250 employees. Industries were divided into 6 groups: 10-41 Industry
and Energy, 45 Construction, 50-55 Trade and Hotels and Restaurants, 60-
64 Transport and Communication, 74 Other Business Activities, and 70-73,
85, 90, 92, 93 Other Services. Amadeus data is for 1997. EU data is for


































































































































































































































































































































































This study explores the significance of firm-specific, institutional, and macroe-
conomic factors in explaining variation in leverage using a sample of firms from
nine Eastern European countries. Country-specific factors are the main deter-
minants of variation in leverage for small unlisted companies, while firm-specific
factors explain most of the variation in leverage for listed and large unlisted
companies. Around half of the variation in leverage related to country factors
is explained by known macroeconomic and institutional factors, while the re-
mainder is explained by unmeasurable institutional differences (e.g. law and
enforcement). These findings are in line with the results for Western European
countries in Jõeveer (2005) and show that country characteristics are not more
significant determinants of leverage in these transition economies.
Keywords: capital structure, Eastern Europe.
JEL classification: G32
∗This paper was written during my stay at the Research Department of Bank of Estonia. I am
grateful for their hospitality and financial support. Contact: CERGE-EI, P.O. Box 882, Politickych
veznu 7, 11121 Prague 1, Czech Republic. E-mail: karin.joeveer@cerge-ei.cz.
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1 Introduction
Firm capital structure is irrelevant in efficient financial markets as shown by Modigliani
and Miller (1958).1 Subsequent theoretical work has taken into account the imperfec-
tions of financial markets and has shown that firm capital structure emerges from three
sources: firm-specific, country of incorporation institutional, and macroeconomic fac-
tors. Empirical research has focused on finding the best set of determinants of leverage
(Titman and Wessel 1988, Frank and Goyal 2004), though lack of comparable firm-
level cross-country data has somewhat hindered the exploration of significant country
factors. In this paper I evaluate the significance of all three sources.
The importance of the country of incorporation for firm leverage has been analysed
in a few cross-country studies. Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic
(2001) show on a sample of firms from ten developing countries that country fixed
effects explain a large share of leverage variation, but they do not decompose the coun-
try effects to show what country characteristics matter. On a sample of firms from
developing Asian and South American countries, Schmukler and Vesperoni (2001) ex-
plore the relation between leverage and financial liberalization. Using data on Western
European firms Giannetti (2003) shows that financial development and creditor pro-
tection are significant determinants of leverage. Jõeveer (2005), also using Western
European firm data, shows that half of the country explanatory power is determined
by six country macroeconomic and institutional factors while another half is explained
by an unmeasurable institutional difference. All the above-mentioned studies confirm
that the country of incorporation does matter for the capital structure of the firm.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) conclude their paper thus: “a better understanding of the
influence of institutions can provide us enough inter-country variation so as to enable
us to identify the fundamental determinants of capital structure.” My paper over-
comes the lack of inter-country variation by studying firm-level data from nine Eastern
European countries over 1995-2002, where the institutional and other country-specific
determinants of capital structure noted in capital structure theory (e.g. adjustment
1Rubinstein (2003) notes that Williams (1938) already expressed the same idea.
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costs of capital, asymmetric information between owners and investors, and capital
market conditions) are expected to be especially significant. Therefore, firms from
Eastern European countries, where modern financial markets emerged only during re-
cent decades, are an excellent sample to study. The methods and speed with which
the missing institutions were introduced differed across countries (Berglof and Bolton
2002), providing large variation in country factors. The leverage of firms in early
transition has been studied by Cornelli, Portes, and Schaffer (1998) and in later tran-
sition by Nivorozhkin (2005) and De Haas and Peeters (2006). My study complements
these existing studies by investigating and evaluating the importance of the country of
incorporation.
The empirical methodology of this paper follows that of Jõeveer (2005). There
are no stylized facts about the sources of leverage variation in transition countries, so
unlike previous studies on transition economies I make use of the variation available
in the cross-country data. First, I perform an analysis of variance (ANOVA) in order
to detect the importance of size, industry, and country factors for leverage variation.
Second, regression analysis is used to compare the direction of the effect of the various
leverage determinants in transition countries to the effects found in the existing capital
structure studies.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I provide an overview of the
related research. In Section 3 I introduce the data and the estimation strategy. Section
4 contains the results, followed by a concluding section.
2 Capital Structure in Transition Economies
The importance of studying the capital structure of firms in transition economies was
first pointed out by Cornelli, Portes, and Schaffer (1998). Since modern financial
markets in those countries emerged in the early 1990’s, in terms of capital structure
theory it meant that local country factors could be especially significant in explaining
firm leverage.
The two most influential theories of capital structure—trade-off theory and pecking
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order theory—find that country institutional factors matter to firm leverage. Trade-off
theory argues that firms balance the tax benefits of loans with potential bankruptcy
costs to achieve an optimal leverage level (see Miller 1977 for a discussion). Hence, local
tax levels as well as bankruptcy codes matter. In the pecking order theory of capital
structure, firms prefer internal funds to outside sources since the latter are mispriced
due to the asymmetric information between owners and investors (see Myers 1984).
Hence, the transparency of the firm’s activities is important. This asymmetric infor-
mation is expected to be especially large in transition economies, meaning that firms
are less likely to turn to outside sources of finance even if the investment opportunities
exceed the internal funds. Also market timing theory reveals that due to changes in
macroeconomic factors the cost of equity capital and debt varies, causing the leverage
to vary as well (see Baker and Wurgler 2002).
Frank and Goyal (2004) note that seven variables—median industry leverage, market-
to-book ratio, collateral, profit, dividend paying, logarithm of assets and expected
inflation—perform best in explaining the leverage of U.S. firms. My study augments
Frank and Goyal’s (2004) work by evaluating the determinants of leverage in a cross-
country setting, which gives a larger variation in country characteristics. I add to the
analysis besides inflation five additional country-specific variables: GDP growth, do-
mestic credit provided by the banking sector to GDP, stock market capitalization to
GDP, share of foreign owned banks, and government consumption to GDP.2
GDP growth has been used in previous studies (Frank and Goyal 2004, Korajczyk
and Levy 2003 in their analysis of aggregate nonfinancial corporate profit growth) to
proxy the growth opportunities and the overall economic conditions. GDP growth is
expected to be positively related to leverage. The ratio of domestic credit provided
by the banking sector to GDP proxies funds available in the local market. It is ex-
pected to be positively related to leverage. The ratio of stock market capitalization
to GDP proxies the development of the financial sector. Giannetti (2003) has shown
that this indicator is negatively related to the leverage of Western European firms.
2Note that Frank and Goyal (2004) experimented with several country-specific variables but all
others besides inflation were less robust determinants.
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The share of foreign-owned banks is an important indicator in Eastern Europe because
under socialism there was no competitive banking system, hence there was a lack of
knowledge and experience of modern banking in the early 1990’s. A higher share of
foreign-owned banks reflects a higher quality of the banking system as well as larger
competition among banks. This translates into more funds available in the domestic
market and hence the higher leverage of firms.3 Note that the share of foreign-owned
banks is highly correlated (73%) with the ratio of FDI to GDP. Hence, the higher
share of foreign-owned banks might be interpreted as a greater interest among foreign
investors in general in a given economy. Higher corporate taxes have been found to be
negatively related to leverage (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2004, Giannetti 2003). Due to
data unavailability I use the fraction of government consumption to GDP as a proxy
for residents’ tax burden.
Capital structure studies on firms from transition economies have generally focused
on the level of leverage and on the firm-specific determinants of leverage. Cornelli,
Portes, and Schaffer (1998) use data on Hungarian and Polish firms from the early
1990’s to report stylized facts about firm leverage in transition countries. They find
that the level of leverage is lower than in Western economies and that the fraction of
short-term financing dominates long-term debt. They estimate a simple static leverage
regression, where the explanatory variables are tangibility, size, profitability and a
dummy for state ownership. In contrast to studies on Western firms, these authors find
that the share of tangible assets, which proxies the available collateral, is negatively
related to leverage in the case of transition countries. They offer two explanations for
this: first, pre-transition firms financed their fixed assets with equity and therefore
the relationship to debt is negative; second, the book value of fixed assets might differ
from the market values. The authors thus report that Eastern European firm capital
structure behaves differently from Western European structure with respect to firm-
specific characteristics. The lack of country-specific variability in their study, however,
means they are unable to measure the significance of institutional and macroeconomic
3See Giannetti and Ongena (2005) for more details about the influence of foreign bank entry on
domestic firm activities in Eastern Europe.
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factors, which is the target of the present paper.
Later studies by Nivorozhkin (2005) and De Haas and Peeters (2006) explore the
dynamic capital structure of firms in transition countries. In a dynamic capital struc-
ture framework actual leverage deviates from desired levels because of adjustment
costs. Both papers use data from the Amadeus database available from Bureau Van
Dijk and adopt the methodology of Banerjee, Heshmati, and Wihlborg (2004); this
methodology allows both the desired leverage and the adjustment speed to vary across
firms and over time. De Haas and Peeters (2006) analyse ten countries over the period
1993-2001. Nivorozhkin (2005) analyses five countries over 1997-2001. Both papers
show that firms are moving towards their leverage targets and conclude that Eastern
European capital markets need to deepen for leverage to reach the Western European
level.
This paper differs from the existing studies on firms from transition economies
by focusing on sources of capital structure with a special interest in country-specific
factors. The cross-country yearly firm-level data used in this study are an excellent
basis on which to evaluate the importance of firm-specific, country institutional and
macroeconomic factors for firm capital structure determination.
3 Data and Methodology
The data used in this paper are taken from the Amadeus database available from
Bureau Van Dijk. This database contains firm-level data from all over Europe. The
Amadeus database is available in different sizes. Firms in this study are taken from
the Amadeus Top 1 million companies.4 The analysis is based on eight years of data
(1995-2002) for nine countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). The database consists not only of stock
market-listed firms but, more importantly, also covers unlisted companies. Klapper,
Sarria-Allende, and Sulla (2002) report that 86% of Eastern European firms in the
Amadeus sample for 1999 have fewer than 250 employees. The data hence covers
4For comparison the firms in De Haas and Peeters (2006) are from the Amadeus Top 200,000
companies, which covers fewer firms (smaller firms are not covered).
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small- and medium-sized firms as well as large companies.
The sample is unbalanced and the representativeness across countries varies.5 Ro-
mania has the greatest coverage. The largest firms are from Poland and the Czech
and Slovak Republics while the smallest are from Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania (see
Table 1).
The methodology used in this paper is adopted from Jõeveer (2005). Hence, the
results of the current study are directly comparable to the findings based on the Western
European firms analysed in Jõeveer (2005). The analysis is divided into two parts. The
first part is the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), which helps to measure the share of
different sources in explaining leverage variation. The second part analyses a regression
of leverage on firm- and country-specific factors.
I consider four sets of explanatory variables in the ANOVA analysis—size, industry,
country, and year. Size and industry represent the firm-specific factors while country
dummies capture the effect of the local financial market.6 I have split firms into five
size classes based on total assets.7 Firms from 51 industries are represented (NACE 2
digit classification).8
The regression analysis focuses on the estimation of the following two specifications:
Yijt = α + βj + γt + δXijt + εijt, (1)
Yijt = α + βj + γt + δXijt + ζCjt + εijt, (2)
5For the Czech Republic and Estonia I know the size distribution of all firms across industries,
which I compared with the size distribution of the Amadeus sample. The Amadeus sample over-
estimates the share of largest firms, which is likely due to the sample selection criteria. Companies
in the Amadeus Top 1 million sample have to meet at least one of the following criteria: operating
revenue greater than 1 million euros, total assets greater than 2 million euros or number of employees
above 10.
6I experimented by adding firm age dummies into the ANOVA analysis; this did not change the
pattern of results.
7The size classes are following: total assets up to $1 million, between $1-2 million, between $2-5
million, between $5-50 million and above $50 million.
8Firms from the financial intermediation sector are excluded from the study due to their specific
liability structure. Also, observations with extreme values (if leverage is less (more) than three times
the inter quartile range away from 25th (75th) percentile) of leverage are excluded.
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where i, j and t are the indexes of firm, country, and year, respectively. The second
equation is the same as the first equation augmented by country-specific time-variant
variables (Cjt) beside country fixed effects (βj). Xijt represents firm-specific variables.
γt is the year effect and εij is the random disturbance.
I use six country variables to capture the measurable country effects: GDP growth,
inflation (proxies for the cost of capital),9 domestic credit provided by the banking
sector to GDP, stock market capitalization to GDP, share of foreign-owned banks,
and government consumption to GDP.10 Firm-specific characteristics included in the
analysis are: profitability (after-tax profit to total assets ratio), tangibility (tangible
fixed assets to total assets ratio), size (logarithm of assets), median industry leverage
and age dummies.11
I use two leverage measures as in Jõeveer (2005). Broad leverage is defined as total
liabilities over total assets, while narrow leverage is defined as debt (both long-term
and short-term) over the sum of debt and shareholder funds. The advantage of the
former measure is that it is available for all firms in the data set; the shortcoming
is that it is likely to overstate the true level of leverage. Since the theory of capital
structure refers to the part of liabilities which are used for financing (in total liabilities
some short-term items might be used for transactions only), the narrow leverage would
seem to be a more relevant measure. But it is still possible that trade credit is used for
financing as well and it would therefore be wrong to exclude it from a capital structure
study (see the discussion in Rajan and Zingales 1995). The two leverage measures differ
greatly from each other (see Table 1). The average of broad leverage is around 60%,
whereas the mean of narrow leverage reaches 40% only for Latvian and Polish firms
but is as low as 5% for Hungarian firms. Compared to results for Western European
9I consider interest rate as a proxy for the cost of capital as well, but due to a high correlation
with inflation it was left out of the final specification.
10The country-specific variables are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators
except for the share of foreign-owned banks, which is taken from the EBRD Transition Report.
11Age is included since both Nivorozhkin (2005) and De Haas and Peeters (2006) find it to be
a significant determinant of leverage in transition economies. I have no information about dividend
payments nor the market value of the company for unlisted firms. Thus the two significant firm-specific
characteristics based on Frank and Goyal (2004)—dividend payment and market-to-book ratio—are
not included in the analysis.
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firms in Jõeveer (2005), both leverage measures are smaller for Eastern European firms.
Smaller firm indebtedness in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe might be
explained by the fact that domestic credit provided by the banking sector (to GDP) is
around 40% in the former and more than 100% in the latter. Leverage measures used
in other studies on transition economies are similar to the ones used in my study.12
I perform the analysis separately on listed and unlisted firms. Since I consider being
listed as a good signal for financiers both domestic as well as foreign, I expect that
local institutions matter less for listed firms’ capital structure.
4 Results
I present the results separately for listed and unlisted firms across the two leverage
measures. Table 2 presents the results of the ANOVA analysis for listed firms. Indus-
try dummies explain most of the leverage variation for both leverage measures (Panel
A and B). In the second column, besides the four sets of discrete variables, firm tangi-
bility and profitability are included. This increases the adjusted R2 and decreases the
explanatory power of the other variables. In the last column, firm characteristics and
measurable time-variant country factors are included. Half of the country effects can
be explained by known country characteristics, suggesting that unmeasurable institu-
tional differences between countries explain less than 10% of firm leverage variation.
For listed firms the ANOVA results are robust to the leverage measure used.
Results of the ANOVA analysis for unlisted firms are presented in Table 3. The
results are not robust to the leverage measure used. For broad leverage, variation
in industry characteristics explains more than country characteristics. For narrow
leverage the results are the opposite—country characteristics explain more than firm
characteristics. Even after controlling for other firm- and country-specific factors (last
column), 26% of narrow leverage variation is explained by unmeasurable institutional
12Cornelli, Portes, and Schaffer (1998) conduct their study on two measures, which corresponds
to the two measures in this paper, and find that their results are robust to the leverage measures.
Nivorozhkin (2005) uses a leverage measure which corresponds to narrow leverage. De Haas and
Peeters (2006) calculate the debt in leverage ratio as total liabilities minus trade credit. The measure
they use is thus somewhere between the two measures used in this paper.
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differences. For broad leverage the comparable number is only 11%. Unmeasurable
institutional differences could be related to the legal environment (e.g. bankruptcy
law, accounting regulations) but it is still puzzling how such institutional differences
have a different effect on listed and unlisted firms.
For unlisted firms the ANOVA results differ for different leverage measures, so it
is really important which leverage measure is used. The main difference between the
two measures comes from the current liability side—narrow leverage takes into account
only short-term debt (not all short-term liabilities). Narrow leverage captures the loan
capacity of the firm, which seems to be highly country-specific for unlisted firms. Broad
leverage, on the other hand, captures non-debt liabilities like trade credit, which is a
particularly important source of funds for more financially constrained firms (Petersen
and Rajan 1997). The trade credit is also a more important source of funds for Eastern
European firms than for Western European firms. Trade credit is 43% of total liabilities
in my Eastern European sample while it is only 24% in the Jõeveer (2005) sample of
firms from ten Western European countries. The non-debt liabilities in Eastern Europe
might have been used as substitutes for debt (if the latter was not available) so that
the country-specific variation in broad leverage is eliminated.
The different results obtained for listed and unlisted firms could be explained by
the fact that listed firms are larger.13 To see whether the results differ due to size
differences I conducted an ANOVA analysis in each of the five size classes. Table
4 presents the results for listed firms. For both leverage measures, industry factors
explain the most for all size classes.14 For unlisted firms (Table 5) the results are
different for firms from different size classes. Country factors explain the most for the
smallest firms’ broad leverage variation. For firms from the four larger size classes,
industry factors dominate in explaining the leverage variation. This is consistent with
the hypothesis that smaller firms rely more heavily on the local financial market. For
unlisted firms’ narrow leverage, country factors explain the most for the four smallest
13The difference might also be caused by ownership—stock market-listed companies are more likely
to have foreign owners, which might ease their financing needs. As I do not have information about
foreign ownership I can not test this.
14I combined the three smallest size classes due to lack of observations.
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size classes. The explanatory shares of country and industry factors are equal for
the largest firms. These results on size classes confirm that for the smallest unlisted
firms, country factors are the most significant leverage determinants for both leverage
measures.15 Those firms are clearly more constrained by the local financial market
than are other firms.
The results of the ANOVA analysis are comparable to the findings from Western
European countries presented in Jõeveer (2005). Exactly as was the case for the listed
firms in Western Europe, industry factors were the most significant determinants of
leverage variation irrespective of firm size. For unlisted Western firms the country fac-
tors always explained the largest share of narrow leverage variation irrespective of size.
For unlisted Western firms’ broad leverage, country factors mattered the most for the
four smaller size classes while for the largest size class, industry factors turned out to
be the most significant. The average firm in Western Europe is larger than in Eastern
Europe, which might explain why we observe a change in the explanatory power of
country and industry factors in smaller size classes in the Eastern European sample.
The firms in size classes 2 to 4 are relatively larger than the average firm in the Eastern
European sample than in the Western European sample. Hence, the ANOVA analysis
stresses the importance of country factors for small unlisted companies’ leverage vari-
ation and it is irrelevant whether those firms are drawn from the pool of developed or
less developed economies. The financing mix of both Eastern and Western European
small firms is, compared to large firms, less dependent on firm-specific technological
factors and more dependent on country of incorporation factors. A comparison of the
results of Eastern and Western European firm leverage analyses does not support the
initial expectation that the lesser-developed financial markets in the East might cause
country factors to be more pronounced for the firm’s capital structure choice.
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 6.16 The results of
listed firms are reported in Panel A. The coefficient in front of tangibility has a neg-
ative sign and is statistically significant. This confirms the results of previous studies
15A different size classification does not change the findings.
16The OLS estimation results presented here are very similar to the results achieved by fixed effects
(available on request).
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on transition countries (Cornelli, Portes, and Schaffer 1998) but contradicts the pre-
dictions of theoretical studies and empirical findings from Western countries (Rajan
and Zingales 1998). A surprising result is that profitability is estimated imprecisely, so
the profitability of Eastern European listed firms does not explain the leverage level.
The logarithm of firm size is positively related to leverage, so larger listed firms have
higher leverage. This is in accordance with both trade-off theory.17 and pecking or-
der theory18 Age is a significant determinant of leverage only at the 10% level for the
broad leverage measure—firms established in early transition are more leveraged than
firms established before 1987 or after 1995. The country-specific macroeconomic and
institutional factors are included in addition to country fixed-effects in columns 2 and
4. The significance and the direction of the effect of country-specific factors vary across
leverage measures. As expected, GDP growth and domestic bank credit to GDP are
positively related to narrow leverage. The negative coefficients in front of market cap-
italization to GDP and the share of foreign banks in the narrow leverage regression,
however, are puzzling.
For unlisted firms (Table 6 Panel B) tangibility is measured imprecisely, such that
the amount of collateral available does not convert into higher indebtedness. Prof-
itability is statistically significant only for the narrow leverage measure, meaning that
the more profitable unlisted firms are likely to have less credit. This finding follows the
prediction of pecking-order theory. As in Jõeveer (2005), the logarithm of size enters
with a negative sign in the broad leverage regression and with a positive sign in the
narrow leverage regression. This finding stresses once again that for unlisted firms the
two leverage ratios measure different things. Based on age dummies included in the
regression, the younger firms are shown to be more leveraged than older firms. Hence
I do not observe that an established reputation would lead to higher leverage as ex-
pected. One explanation for this might be that older firms have enough internal funds
and do not need debt finance. I find country factors to be more significant and have
17Larger firms face a proportionally smaller bankruptcy cost, so they are likely to have more debt.
18Larger firms are more transparent so they should face less asymmetry of information. Larger
firms should therefore rely more on external finance. Since equity issues are not common in transition
countries it is likely that large firms rely more on debt.
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larger coefficients for narrow leverage than for broad leverage. The signs of country
characteristics in the narrow leverage regression are as expected except for the negative
sign in front of the share of foreign banks.
The results of the regression analysis are in line with previous studies on firms
from transition countries. It is interesting that firm-specific factors tangibility and
profitability are only weakly related to leverage. From country-specific factors it is
notable that the positive significant coefficient in front of domestic bank credit in
the narrow leverage regression appears for both listed and unlisted firms. This result
confirms the hypothesis that less local credit causes lower leverage levels.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I study the importance of firm-specific, country institutional, and macroe-
conomic factors for determining the capital structure of firms. The analysis is based on
firm-level data from nine Eastern European countries in 1995-2002. I use both broad
and narrow measures of leverage in this paper.
I find that the largest share of listed firms’ leverage variation (irrespective of lever-
age measure) is explained by industry factors. The unmeasurable country institutional
factors explain less than 10% of leverage variation. For unlisted firms, in contrast, the
results are not robust to the leverage measure used. For broad leverage the indus-
try factors explain the most while for narrow leverage the country factors dominate.
Further, the unmeasurable country institutional differences explain as much as 26% of
narrow leverage variation while it explains only 11% for broad leverage variation. The
results across size classes show that for smaller unlisted firms, country factors are the
most significant explanatory factors for both leverage measures. These results show
that for small and unlisted firms the leverage definition is very significant. Smaller firms
seem to be more constrained by the financial market in their country of incorporation.
The results of this study are very similar to the findings of Jõeveer (2005) on
a sample of Western European firms. The capital structure variation of small- and
medium-sized firms is more dependent on country institutional factors, irrespective of
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the development of the local financial markets. The regression analysis of leverage
confirms the existing results based on transition countries. These findings stress the
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Table 1 — Summary statistics in 2000
Country Leverage 1 Leverage 2 Total Assets Number of
Firms
Bulgaria
Mean 0.59 0.12 1386 13189
Median 0.58 0 211
St. dev. 0.36 0.25 12977
Czech Republic
Mean 0.61 0.28 10058 7374
Median 0.63 0.16 2100
St. dev. 0.31 0.33 83557
Estonia
Mean 0.62 0.31 1677 5224
Median 0.63 0.21 332
St. dev. 0.3 0.33 12575
Hungary
Mean 0.62 0.05 5738 7923
Median 0.63 0 907
St. dev. 0.3 0.14 40254
Latvia
Mean 0.65 0.4 3699 2178
Median 0.69 0.35 744
St. dev. 0.28 0.35 22422
Lithuania
Mean 0.53 0.34 6693 1143
Median 0.54 0.3 1091
St. dev. 0.26 0.26 41957
Poland
Mean 0.59 0.4 16283 10933
Median 0.59 0.35 3365
St. dev. 0.37 0.32 114655
Romania
Mean 0.76 0.2 1628 23274
Median 0.81 0 161
St. dev. 0.31 0.32 34299
Slovak Republic
Mean 0.59 0.3 10770 1312
Median 0.62 0.17 2120
St. dev. 0.32 0.34 58098
Notes: Leverage 1 is defined as total liabilities to total assets. Leverage
2 is defined as debt to debt plus shareholders’ funds. Total assets are in
thousands of USD.
84
Table 2 — Anova results for listed firms
Panel A — broad leverage
Source SSR SSR SSR
Size 4.97 12% 4.00 7% 4.24 8%
( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 5 )
Industry 25.86 63% 27.64 51% 27.17 49%
( 47 ) ( 47 ) ( 47 )
Country 8.30 20% 8.50 16% 4.91 9%
( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 )
Year 5.88 14% 3.69 7% 0.50 1%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 41.22 54.00 55.38
Total 223.16 223.16 223.16
Firm ch. No Yes Yes
Country ch. No No Yes
Adj. R2 0.17 0.23 0.23
Obs. 3512 3512 3512
Panel B — narrow leverage
Source SSR SSR SSR
Size 7.54 26% 6.29 20% 6.58 19%
( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 5 )
Industry 9.36 32% 10.67 33% 10.16 30%
( 46 ) ( 46 ) ( 46 )
Country 6.10 21% 6.38 20% 2.53 7%
( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 )
Year 2.29 8% 2.46 8% 1.17 3%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 28.89 31.94 33.87
Total 126.16 126.16 126.16
Firm ch. No Yes Yes
Country ch. No No Yes
Adj. R2 0.21 0.24 0.25
Obs. 2905 2905 2905
Notes: Numbers in cells refer to partial sum of squares
(SSR). The numbers in parentheses refer to number of in-
dicators. Broad leverage is defined as total liabilities to total
assets. Narrow leverage is defined as debt to debt plus share-
holders’ funds. Industry is 3-digit NACE. Firm size classes:
Class 1 total assets (TA) smaller than $1 million, Class 2 TA
between $1 and 2 million, Class 3 TA between $2 and 5 mil-
lion, Class 4 TA between $5 to 50 million, and Class 5 TA
above $50 million. Firm characteristics are tangible assets to
total assets and profit to asset ratios. Country characteristics
are GDP growth rate, inflation, domestic credit to GDP, total
market capitalization to GDP, share of foreign-owned banks’
assets and government consumption to GDP.
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Table 3 — Anova results for unlisted firms
Panel A — broad leverage
Source SSR SSR SSR
Size 268.71 6% 266.35 6% 255.70 5%
( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 5 )
Industry 1469.74 34% 1412.97 31% 1418.39 30%
( 51 ) ( 51 ) ( 51 )
Country 1093.85 25% 1107.77 24% 547.39 11%
( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 )
Year 949.34 22% 915.03 20% 48.99 1%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 4295.34 4629.87 4770.03
Total 41696.58 41696.58 41696.58
Firm ch. No Yes Yes
Country ch. No No Yes
Adj. R2 0.10 0.11 0.11
Obs. 379324 379324 379324
Panel B — narrow leverage
Source SSR SSR SSR
Size 285.51 8% 279.61 8% 282.90 8%
( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 5 )
Industry 578.33 16% 575.23 16% 578.77 16%
( 51 ) ( 51 ) ( 51 )
Country 1892.11 53% 1890.64 53% 972.83 26%
( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 )
Year 118.71 3% 114.33 3% 55.86 1%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 3563.85 3585.06 3730.67
Total 29763.80 29763.80 29763.80
Firm ch. No Yes Yes
Country ch. No No Yes
Adj. R2 0.12 0.12 0.13
Obs. 330292 330292 330292
Notes: Numbers in cells refer to partial sum of squares (SSR). The
numbers in parentheses refer to number of indicators. Broad lever-
age is defined as total liabilities to total assets. Narrow leverage is
defined as debt to debt plus shareholders’ funds. Industry is 3-digit
NACE. Firm size classes: Class 1 total assets (TA) smaller than $1
million, Class 2 TA between $1 and 2 million, Class 3 TA between $2
and 5 million, Class 4 TA between $5 to 50 million, and Class 5 TA
above $50 million. Firm characteristics are tangible assets to total
assets and profit to asset ratios. Country characteristics are GDP
growth rate, inflation, domestic credit to GDP, total market capital-
ization to GDP, share of foreign-owned banks’ assets and government
consumption to GDP.
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Table 4 — Anova results for listed firms
by size class
Panel A — broad leverage
Source Size<4 Size 4 Size 5
Industry 16.43 75% 15.22 64% 9.11 64%
( 41 ) ( 39 ) ( 38 )
Country 0.65 3% 7.17 30% 2.72 19%
( 7 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 )
Year 4.67 21% 2.54 11% 0.75 5%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 21.91 23.71 14.26
Total 84.72 100.74 35.69
Adj. R2 0.22 0.21 0.35
Obs. 1156 1651 705
Panel B — narrow leverage
Source Size<4 Size 4 Size 5
Industry 3.61 56% 7.26 58% 5.73 53%
( 40 ) ( 36 ) ( 35 )
Country 0.25 4% 3.40 27% 3.80 35%
( 7 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 )
Year 2.49 39% 0.96 8% 0.27 2%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 6.46 12.53 10.84
Total 31.57 60.45 26.10
Adj. R2 0.17 0.18 0.35
Obs. 1103 1283 519
Notes: Numbers in cells refer to partial sum of squares
(SSR). The numbers in parentheses refer to number of
indicators. Broad leverage is defined as total liabilities to
total assets. Narrow leverage is defined as debt to debt
plus shareholders’ funds. Industry is 3-digit NACE. Firm
size classes: Class 1 total assets (TA) smaller than $1
million, Class 2 TA between $1 and 2 million, Class 3 TA
between $2 and 5 million, Class 4 TA between $5 to 50
million, and Class 5 TA above $50 million.
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Table 5 — Anova results for unlisted firms
by size class
Panel A — broad leverage
Source Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5
Industry 595.88 24% 232.97 62% 333.23 69% 477.56 81% 97.77 79%
( 51 ) ( 50 ) ( 50 ) ( 51 ) ( 51 )
Country 1163.07 46% 44.42 12% 46.37 10% 22.72 4% 6.14 5%
( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 )
Year 658.33 26% 109.44 29% 99.52 21% 71.64 12% 8.70 7%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 2513.39 376.79 481.63 587.57 123.85
Total 27180.28 4099.03 4877.94 4236.45 520.58
Adj. R2 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.23
Obs. 242254 42335 46791 43126 4818
Panel B — narrow leverage
Source Size 1 Size 2 Size 3 Size 4 Size 5
Industry 351.82 24% 81.26 22% 89.61 19% 141.80 24% 44.66 36%
( 51 ) ( 50 ) ( 50 ) ( 51 ) ( 51 )
Country 889.94 60% 297.46 79% 353.14 73% 348.26 59% 43.47 35%
( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 ) ( 9 )
Year 130.03 9% 21.46 6% 7.64 2% 24.17 4% 5.05 4%
( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 )
Model 1473.35 403.09 454.02 516.17 96.89
Total 17591.97 3542.17 3777.65 3523.31 411.44
Adj. R2 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.22
Obs. 219906 35190 37293 34074 3829
Notes: Numbers in cells refer to partial sum of squares (SSR). The numbers in parentheses
refer to number of indicators. Broad leverage is defined as total liabilities to total assets.
Narrow leverage is defined as debt to debt plus shareholders’ funds. Industry is 3-digit NACE.
Firm size classes: Class 1 total assets (TA) smaller than $1 million, Class 2 TA between $1
and 2 million, Class 3 TA between $2 and 5 million, Class 4 TA between $5 to 50 million, and
Class 5 TA above $50 million.
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Table 6 – Leverage regression in 1995-2002
Panel A – Listed firms
Leverage 1 Leverage 2
Const. .038 .044 -.084 -.12
(.055) (.081) (.047)∗ (.078)
Tangibility -.217 -.207 -.124 -.113
(.035)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗
Profitability -.002 -.002 .0002 .0005
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)
Log assets .022 .023 .029 .03
(.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Established 1987-95 .042 .043 .026 .027
(.024)∗ (.024)∗ (.02) (.02)
Established after 1995 1.00e-05 .002 -.008 -.006
(.023) (.024) (.018) (.018)
Industry leverage .806 .794 .682 .656
(.058)∗∗∗ (.059)∗∗∗ (.071)∗∗∗ (.071)∗∗∗




Domestic bank credit .0005 .001
(.0004) (.0004)∗∗∗
Market capitalization -.001 -.003
(.001) (.001)∗∗∗
Share of foreign banks .001 -.001
(.0007)∗∗ (.0006)∗∗
Government consumption -.002 -.002
(.003) (.003)
Obs. 3512 3512 2905 2905
R2 .234 .238 .245 .258
Notes: Leverage 1 is defined as total liabilities over total assets. Leverage 2 is
defined as debt over debt plus equity. Standard errors are in brackets. ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Standard
errors are based on clustering across firms. All regressions include country and year
dummies. Tangibility is defined as tangible assets to total assets. Profitability is
defined as profit to total assets. Established 1987-95 is a dummy equal to one if
the firm was established between 1987-95. Established after 1995 is a dummy equal
to one if the firm was established after 1995. Domestic bank credit, total market
capitalization and government consumption are measured as ratio to GDP.
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Panel B – Unlisted firms
Leverage 1 Leverage 2
Const. .145 .371 -.129 -.182
(.013)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
Tangibility -.015 -.015 .0007 .0007
(.014) (.014) (.0007) (.0007)
Profitability -.025 -.024 -.013 -.013
(.016) (.016) (.007)∗∗ (.006)∗∗
Log assets -.014 -.014 .023 .023
(.0007)∗∗∗ (.0007)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗∗ (.0005)∗∗∗
Established 1987-95 .059 .065 .087 .091
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Established after 1995 .119 .123 .092 .096
(.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Industry leverage .571 .57 .557 .548
(.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗




Domestic bank credit -.00003 .002
(.00008) (.00008)∗∗∗
Market capitalization -.00009 .001
(.0001) (.0001)∗∗∗
Share of foreign banks .0009 -.0003
(.00009)∗∗∗ (.0001)∗∗∗
Government consumption -.011 -.002
(.0004)∗∗∗ (.0004)∗∗∗
Obs. 379324 379324 330292 330292
R2 .123 .126 .118 .123
Notes: Leverage 1 is defined as total liabilities over total assets. Leverage 2 is
defined as debt over debt plus equity. Standard errors are in brackets. ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Standard
errors are based on clustering across firms. All regressions include country and year
dummies. Tangibility is defined as tangible assets to total assets. Profitability is
defined as profit to total assets. Established 1987-95 is a dummy equal to one if
the firm was established between 1987-95. Established after 1995 is a dummy equal
to one if the firm was established after 1995. Domestic bank credit, total market
capitalization and government consumption are measured as ratio to GDP.
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